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I demonstrate that referee comments at a scholarly journal contain information on 
submissions’ future citation impact above and beyond information available in referee 
scores. I measure this signal on future citation impact and show that it does not enter 
into editorial decision-making directly but rather through an interaction that amplifies 
the information content of referee scores: the more citations predicted for a low- or 
mediocre-scoring paper, the less likely it is to be published. Secondly, I describe 
referee comments that are highly predictive of greater citations. Papers that referees 
say have access to unique datasets, or are written on topics of relevance to ongoing 
debates or government applications receive greater citations on average. Third, I 
show the appearance of favoritism amongst editors who accept a higher share of 
papers that cite themselves is partly a reflection of an ability to draw and select for 
papers that receive more citations. Finally, I characterize budget constraints on 
publication space and referee capital and provide some guidance on what types of 
 
 
information editorial systems could capture to promote transparency in future 
analyses while protecting privacy of authors or referees.  
 
A second chapter introduces a theoretical framework for assessing the empirical 
discussion of asymmetric information amongst mortgage lenders and adds the idea of 
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In economics, we often wish to understand decisions driven by utility functions 
that may have multiple inputs. For example, a consumer’s choice of digital camera 
purchase may depend on his utility from multiple camera attributes such as 
megapixels per photo, storage, battery life, lens quality, and cost, plus interactions 
between these and other attributes. Likewise, a supervisor’s choice for a promotion 
may depend on noisy signals received from others on any number of an employee’s 
characteristics. Many decisions -- from an individual’s choice of restaurant, a 
supervisor’s choice for promotion, or an editor’s choice of papers to publish -- share 
this multi-facetedness.  
Since empirical analysis requires metrics or proxies for each facet of interest, 
economists have traditionally had to restrict empirical studies of decision-making, 
signaling, information and learning to those phenomena, decisions and decision-
makers for which metrics on various utility inputs are available, either through careful 
and often expensive or difficult-to-arrange research studies or through sheer chance 
of existing datasets appropriate for econometric evaluation. In the absence of highly 




sharing versus preference similarity between peers can be studied only theoretically 
for a lack of available data on decision-making inputs. Even studies where limited 
data, such as user ratings, make some empirical analysis feasible may still be plagued 
with questions of endogeneity due to unobserved variables, such as unrated 
characteristics of a good, service or employee. 
Of course, empirical analysis of the role of information is simplified in cases 
where ratings and other summary product characteristics provide directly observable 
numerical data on each relevant attribute of a good or service. However, typically, 
decision-makers reading reviews (and the researchers who study them) have access to 
just one or perhaps a few summary ratings combined with unstructured information 
such as long bodies of text. This poses a challenge as researchers may not be able to 
measure some key attributes that enter individual utility functions. For example, an 
editor with a high aversion to publishing results that could subsequently be refuted 
may skim reviews for descriptions of errors that cannot be overcome with revision; 
however, the distinction between errors that can and cannot be ameliorated with 
revision may not be fully broken out in numerical ratings that accompany reviews and 
therefore may not be directly measurable to a researcher.  
A key contribution of this paper is to present methods for building metrics on 
relevant attributes of goods and services from textual reviews -- here in the context of 
referee reviews and editorial decisions. I demonstrate not only that it is possible to 
build metrics from referee language that capture information about paper attributes 
such as eventual citations but that these metrics also capture information about 




those referee reviews. These results suggest that decision-makers who read reviews 
may disambiguate and reintegrate information available in the reviews and summary 
ratings according to their own unique preferences rather than simply accepting 
referees’ summary weighting of relevant signals. Therefore, researchers should not 
rely solely on summary ratings that accompany reviews for a complete understanding 
of signaling in review systems unless there is sufficient evidence of homogeneity in 
the weighting of factors among users and writers of reviews. By demonstrating that 
under certain circumstances it is possible to build metrics from raw text to measure 
distinct utility inputs, this work highlights the possibility of a much richer set of 
studies on decision-making in the presence of reviews than previously could be 
endeavored. 
A second set of contributions come from the insights this study provides into 
editorial incentives, referee scoring and citation drivers at five scholarly journals that 
provided access to their editorial databases for the period from 1992-2010. Previous 
empirical literature on journals (see subsequent section for a more detailed 
discussion) focuses on evaluating editorial bias towards secondary characteristics of 
papers (i.e. authors’ genders, institution rank, and age for example) and journals’ 
effectiveness at filtering for high quality papers, with quality defined as a paper’s 
ultimate citation impact. Rather than assuming that citation impact enters directly into 
an editor’s decision, I use a referee-language-based predictor of citations at one 
journal to investigate both direct and interaction effects of citations in editorial 
decisions. I find that my predictor of citations does not enter editorial decisions 




decisions principally through a negative interaction with negative referee scores (and 
a smaller positive interaction with positive referee scores). In other words, the more 
low referee scores that a paper receives the more negative the impact of its citeability 
on getting accepted. These results suggest that editors may care more about the risk 
presented by a submission's citeability than its direct potential to be cited. For 
excellent, consistently well-scoring papers, citeability is positively correlated with 
acceptance whereas for papers with mixed reviews citeability has a negative effect. 
Besides evaluating editorial incentives, I also provide an analysis of referee 
preferences, drivers of citations, and other summary information on the journals. 
The remainder of this paper is organized into the following sections. Section 2 
provides some background into editorial incentives and the existing literature on this 
topic. The editorial data that are used are described in detail in Section 3, including 
summary statistics on referee recommendations, editorial decisions and other aspects 
of the review process. In Section 4, I provide a background on natural language 
processing (NLP) methods used by computational linguists for evaluating document 
and corpus similarity in a wide range of contexts and describe how I implement these 
tools to evaluate submissions’ fit to their journal’s subject niche. In Section 5, I 
describe and estimate a statistical model for predicting a submission’s citation impact 
using language from first round referee comments. The results yield a journal-specific 
early-stage predictor of citation impact that can be measured for published and 
unpublished papers alike. I discuss intermediate results from the analysis of referee 
terms which are interesting because of what they reveal about papers that receive 




limitations to consider when interpreting results from this type of textual analysis. I 
conclude Section 5 with a discussion of other submission characteristics that are 
predictive of greater citations. In Section 6, I evaluate the role of various factors such 
as predicted citations in referee scores to help provide a clearer understanding of what 
referee signals communicate. Section 7 gives an in-depth econometric assessment of 
editorial decisions, incorporating analysis of referee reports and citation impact 
together with a more basic assessment of editorial decisions across all five journals. 
Section 8 provides a discussion of the results and Section 9 concludes. 
2. What We Do (And Don’t) Know About Editorial Incentives 
As gatekeepers who decide what new ideas in their areas of expertise are worthy 
of publication, journal editors may face incentives on a number of factors. For 
example, they may care about their journals’ ranking on impact factor, which is a 
measure of the frequency with which the average article published in a journal 
receives citations over a certain period of time. Higher impact factors often mean that 
more researchers pay attention to the journal; in turn these may lead to greater 
prestige and influence for the editors as well as higher profits via institutional 
subscriptions. Pressure to increase profits from publication could also encourage 
editors to broaden the readership and niche of the journal or both; journals may be 
able to use larger numbers of published articles per issue to justify a higher 
subscription fee. On the other hand, pressure to increase profits could also push 
editors to spend less money on publication costs in the form of fewer articles and 




to a broader readership and bring a broader pool of articles from which to select 
quality publications, a more specialized niche may lower the editorial workload 
involved in processing large numbers of submissions and increase attention and 
quality of submissions from researchers within the specialized area. In addition, as 
trained scientists, editors will also be expected to value quality science. The peer 
review system also contains further built-in incentives to publish rigorous, accurate 
work, as editors may face potential embarrassment from colleagues if they publish 
research that is later refuted. 
In addition to a submission’s technical accuracy and merit, potential for impact, 
and fit within the journal’s niche, editors may face personal spillovers and benefits 
from their decisions. Since editors are sometimes active or recent researchers in their 
journals’ niches, they may benefit or face competition from publication of articles on 
topics related to their own or their colleagues’ work or which cite themselves directly. 
Referees, too, are typically active researchers in the fields they referee and may face 
similar incentives; yet, their reputations may be on the line in lesser or different ways, 
particularly since their identities are usually kept anonymous.  
While there have been a number of economic studies of outcomes and durations 
of the editorial review process, there is not much research evaluating editorial 
incentives or how editors (or referees) gather and interpret information on these or 
other factors. As discussed below, those studies that consider editorial incentives 
often use citation impact as a direct measure or proxy for quality without examining 




in editorial and referee incentives as well as the availability of information about 
citations in both referee scores and reviews. 
The limited literature with access to data on both accepted and rejected 
submissions, such as Abreveya and Hamermesh (2009) and Hamermesh and Oster 
(1998), focuses largely on editorial bias for secondary characteristics of papers 
(authors’ gender, institution rank, and age for example). Blank (1991) looks at which 
editorial practices (i.e. single- or double-blind) are more biased1 on some of these 
secondary characteristics. One exception, Cherkashin et al (2009), evaluates how well 
editors are selecting quality papers by following rejected papers at one journal that 
were eventually published elsewhere. By tracking the number of citations received by 
both accepted papers and rejected papers that go on to get published elsewhere, the 
authors study whether editors are rejecting the “right” (i.e. low impact) papers. In 
drawing comparisons between the number of citations received by papers at the 
original journal versus other publications, they face the challenge that their data and 
methods are not powerful enough to break out the journal-specific component of 
citations, i.e. the fraction of citations due to a particular journal’s ability to broadcast 
research and its interaction with particular niches or articles. Notably, none of this 
empirical literature examines whether impact is in fact a direct, let alone primary, 
driver of editorial decisions and what role other factors play.  
                                                 
1 I use the term bias broadly here in order to encapsulate both desirable and undesirable selection 
behavior. Obviously, editors are hired to bring certain bias for selecting high quality papers. They may 
also have other biases that are not desirable from the perspective of publishers or researchers working 




Ellison (2002), Laband (1990), and Laband and Piette (1994) are among the few 
papers that comment on editorial incentives and/or the information content of referee 
reviews. Ellison provides a theory of editorial incentives and referee communication 
as part of explaining why editorial lags may have increased over the years. He 
hypothesizes that editors value quality along two dimensions, i.e. those that are 
inherent in a paper and those that can be improved with revision. He makes the case 
that the balance between value placed on the two is a social norm that may change 
over time. In his model, authors are the only ones who act “non-mechanically;” 
referees and editors receive perfect signals on each of the two dimensions and select 
those submissions with the highest combined quality to publish. If referees’ 
expectations regarding the social norm thresholds for publication in their fields comes 
from personal experience sending their own submissions to journals, and if referees 
overvalue their own work, then Ellison finds referees may become tougher and 
demand more revisions over time, lengthening the publication process. He suggests 
that the most worthwhile extensions of his work would be to examine what happens if 
referees send/receive noisy signals and if there are editor fixed-effects reflecting more 
“revision-loving” editors.  
Laband and Piette (1994) look at citations data on published papers to show that 
when editors publish work by past coauthors or graduate students, it usually though 
not always goes on to have higher citation impact, suggesting that editors use their 
networks to identify and capture better research and improve efficiency in the market 




Finally, Laband (1990) conducts a survey to gather data characterizing the role of 
referees in the review process. His findings describe how critical referees’ letters are 
to helping authors revise their work and how much more information they contain 
than editors’ letters to authors. Laband makes the case that referees provide much 
more than a signal to editors about which papers are most promising for publication; 
rather, they are active contributors to the production of “good papers,” where “good” 
is once again implicitly defined as highly citeable. He also provides a striking quote 
from one of the editors in his study who laments that his job as an editor requires him 
to spend too much time trying to improve the quality of “marginal” papers. While this 
may seem a stunning admission, Laband explains that this editor is only admitting 
what the data show for every other journal in the study, namely that each publishes a 
fair number of papers that go on to receive zero citations. He argues these anecdotes 
reflect a shortage of high-quality paper submissions at many journals, causing editors 
to rely more heavily on reviewers to help improve marginal submissions to the 
minimum acceptable threshold for publication. Lastly, he also suggests that matching 
submissions to good complementary referees who can play a productive role in the 
development of those assigned submissions may be one of the primary roles of an 
editor. 2 
Instead of making assumptions about the relationship between citation impact and 
quality, or relying on surveys or controlled experiments to shed light on the role of 
referees and editors, I combine textual and econometric analyses to gather and 
                                                 




measure information on different attributes of submission quality from written 
documents then employ logit and OLS regressions to track how this information 
flows into and reflects on editor and referee incentives and citation outcomes.  
Besides challenging the assumption in the literature that citations are directly 
correlated with editors’ definition of submission quality, my findings provide 
empirical validation and significant extensions of a number of hypotheses presented 
by Ellison (2002), Laband (1990), Laband and Piette (1994), and others. I 
demonstrate that initial referee reports contain a great deal more information about 
potential impact than is captured by the scores referees assign. I find some direct 
evidence in support of Laband’s postulation that referees actively contribute to the 
production of good papers. Conditional on getting accepted, papers for which referees 
make certain kinds of suggestions for improvement such as “the authors need…” or 
“…would be interesting” go on to receive significantly more citations. I show that 
referee scores decrease over time and with the number of previous reviews a referee 
has submitted as Ellison theorizes, although I cannot rule out that this trend is 
partially due to lower paper quality or the editors’ selection of harsher reviewers over 
time. I characterize editor-specific fixed effects that support Laband’s and Ellison’s 
theories that some editors possess better abilities to match papers to referees and/or 
revision-loving behavior. Finally, the framework I employ overcomes a challenge 
faced by both Laband and Cherkashin et al. Since they cannot directly observe how 
many more or fewer citations a rejected submission would have received at the 
journal it was originally submitted to, they must rely on the number of citations 




journal fixed effects in Laband’s case but not article-journal interactions. Since my 
measure of citations is both article- and journal-specific, I can predict how many 
citations would be received at the original journal by a particular paper, even for 
rejected submissions. 
3. Overview of the Editorial Process and Data  
The data used in this study come from several scientific journals that have granted 
permission and secure access to their editorial databases as well as from public 
sources of citation data online, such as REPEC. These databases include a variety of 
information used in the manuscript evaluation process including submissions, 
decisions, and correspondence between editors, referees and authors. 
In order to respect the privacy of the journals, their identities and those of their 
editors, authors and referees are treated with strict confidentiality. Certain additional 
identifying data such as editor names and some referee language are suppressed in the 
analysis in order to respect this confidentiality. Finally, the scope of this work was 
reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of 
Maryland to ensure it does not fall under the use of human subject data. 
3.1    Timing and Scoring in the Editorial Process 
At each of the journals studied, submissions are first received by the editor-in-
chief who then assigns each submission to a coeditor, typically based on coeditor 
interests, expertise and workload. After reviewing the submission, the coeditor will 




to for review. Each of these referees will either decline or agree to review the 
submission. Referees agreeing to review will provide an evaluation score together 
with a note to the editor and/or a written referee report outlining some combination of 
the submission’s contributions, shortcomings, suggested changes and a suggested 
course of action. For submissions that did not receive an initial summary desk reject, 
the coeditor typically waits for all referee evaluations to arrive before reviewing them 
and making a decision. Editors generally attempt to obtain reports and scores from all 
referees in order to avoid bias towards certain reviewers, but sometimes exceptions 
are made to facilitate the timeliness of decisions. 
After each round of review, the editor chooses one of the following decisions for 
each submission. Those decisions indicating acceptance or some kind of rejection are 
final, while others requesting revisions provide an opportunity for the author to 
prepare an updated draft for a subsequent round of review. 
 
Editor Decisions 
Summary Reject, No Referee Input 
Summary Reject, Referee Input 
Reject 
Returned for Revision 
Conditionally Accepted (Minor Revisions)
Accept 
 
Even within the first round, several factors affect the number of referees an editor 
will ask to review a submission. An editor may seek more or less information from 




editor may seek referees to validate his own point of view or may select a number of 
referees to comment on different facets of a paper, such as its contribution to different 
literatures. If a referee indicates a low familiarity with a paper’s field in her 
evaluation or identifies additional areas where expertise is warranted, an editor may 
solicit reviews from additional referees before making his first round decision. 
Referees can also decline to review a submission. If they agree to complete a 






Weak Revise & Resubmit 
Revise & Resubmit 
Strong Revise & Resubmit 
Accept with Revisions 
Accept 
 
3.2    Summary of Available Data 
Altogether five journals provided access to data on a total of 16,817 submissions 
from 1992-2010 for which final editorial decisions had been assigned. 3,189 of these 
were at Journal 4, where more extensive analysis was carried out. Tables A.a. and 
A.b. show the breakdown of these submissions by journal together with their ultimate 




rejected by the assigned editor before completing the review process, rejected after 
completing full review, and withdrawn by the author.  
The data show a great deal of variability between journals. Between 11-33% of 
first round submissions at each journal were desk rejected without any referee review. 
Another 0-5% were summarily rejected by the assigned editor before completing the 
review process. In each database, between 15-70% of submissions were eventually 
accepted. Table A.b. shows the same summary measures restricted to the period 
between 2006-2010, which reflects greater annual submission volumes at each 
journal as well as greater selectivity. During this time, desk rejects are higher at 16-
47% of submissions and acceptances rates are lower at 9-58%, depending on the 
journal. 
Although editorial decisions are available for all of these submissions, due to slow 
adoption of editorial databases, only a subset of articles, primarily from 2006 onward 
(2004 at Journal 4), underwent electronically documented referee review and can 
therefore be analyzed to understand the information content of referee scoring, 
review-writing, and their role in the editorial process. Table B shows additional detail 
on the subset of submissions (21-78% depending on the journal) that were sent for 
review. A total of 8,934 first round referee evaluations were available for 4,107 
submissions that underwent full review. Of these, 3,040 evaluations correspond to 
1,452 submissions at Journal 4, where more extensive analysis was carried out. The 
data here show both the fraction of referees that agreed to review their assigned 
manuscripts together with the distribution of scores they assigned by journal and 




These data reflect a slightly different picture at each journal. While Journal 4 
appears to be the most selective of the five journals, it also subjects the largest 
number of submissions to first, second and third round reviews. The larger sample 
size of initial reviews makes it ideal for more extensive analysis of information 
content of reviews and their role in the editorial process. Here, the majority (56%) of 
referee scores in the first round were reject or definite reject while very few (6%) 
recommended acceptance or acceptance with additional revisions. However, this 
tendency to recommend rejection in the first round was reversed in the second round 
where 65% of referee scores recommended acceptance with or without additional 
revisions and only 13% recommend rejection or definite rejection. Referee scores 
tend to be even more positive in the third round, with 84% recommending acceptance 
with or without additional revisions and just 4% recommending rejection or definite 
rejection. Not only do referee scores become more positive with further revisions at 
Journal 4 but, conversely from other journals, they also become more definitive with 
firm accept/reject recommendations making up an increasing fraction of referee 
scores and revise and resubmit recommendations a decreasing share of scores in 
subsequent rounds. The greater number of review rounds and increasing 
definitiveness of referee scores at Journal 4 may suggest that the review process plays 
a more intensive and important role there, both in improving the quality of 
submissions and in weighing into editorial decisions. 
Table C shows the distribution of the number of reviews received by submissions 
in the first round across all journals. Most reviewed submissions (≥94%) receive 




frequently received number (46-62% of reviewed submissions) at all journals. No 
submission received more than five reviews. 
The figures in Appendix D depict how final editorial decisions vary with first 
round referee evaluations at Journal 4. For all papers receiving two referee 
evaluations in the first round, the top panel shows how many received zero, one and 
two positive referee recommendations (i.e. revise/resubmit or acceptance) and how 
many of these were eventually accepted by editors (red) or rejected (blue). The lower 
two panels show the same distributions for papers receiving three and four total 
referee evaluations, respectively. Not surprisingly, holding the total number of 
reviews a paper receives constant, the higher the number of positive referee 
recommendations (i.e. some type of recommended revise and resubmit or 
acceptance), the more likely an editor is to eventually accept the submission rather 
than reject it. This trend could reflect some combination of two factors: first, editors’ 
own views of a paper are likely to be correlated with referees’ opinions and second, 
editors weigh the recommendations of referees in their own final decisions. 
To conduct the textual analysis of manuscripts and referee comments described in 
Section 4, I have extracted full texts of 6,759 manuscripts across all five journals,3 
primarily from 2002 onwards. This includes 2,633 of 3,189 manuscripts at Journal 4 
and earliest versions of 2,173 of those. In addition, I processed full texts of 2,930 
referee reviews (i.e. combined referee reports and referee remarks to the editors) at 
                                                 
3 Due to gradual onset of electronic submissions, some manuscripts (particularly older ones) were 
not stored in editorial databases. Of those that are available electronically, some could not be converted 




Journal 4 corresponding to 1,310 manuscripts. Of those referee comments, 458 
correspond to initial reviews of 220 submissions that were eventually published. I 
have been able to identify citation counts for 187 of these publications. 
Citations data was collected by hand through REPEC over the course of a week in 
order to ensure that there was no significant date bias in the number of citations each 
published paper received. Appendix E shows the distribution of citation counts for 
this sample. 
4. Textual Analysis 
The last two decades have seen significant advances in algorithms for analyzing 
and building meaningful numeric metrics from unstructured textual content. While 
these computer science-based algorithms have long been iterated on and have 
ultimately facilitated powerful, practical tools including search engines, electronic 
record-management, and even image classification technologies, they are still rarely 
employed by economists in the study of decision-making. My hope is that this work 
will serve as an example of how, when it comes to analyzing decisions, text-based 
and machine learning models are at their most powerful when combined with 
appropriate economic models. These tools often require econometric analysis to 
elucidate the meaning of metrics, to disambiguate between causation and correlation, 
and to identify the mechanisms through which measurable information is driving 
outcomes. 
One of several reasons for the dearth of natural language processing and machine 




box. Simply building a machine learning algorithm that can successfully predict an 
editor’s decision does not necessarily convey the researcher an inherent understanding 
of the decision process or even the material factors that influence it. The approach 
taken in this paper is unique in that I first build metrics using textual analysis and 
machine-learning-based model selection tools that capture information about journal 
submissions. Then, I rely on simple, traditional, econometric tools (in this case, 
binary and ordered logits) to measure and interpret the role played by those and other 
factors in referee and editorial decisions. 
The family of text-based models and algorithms employed in this analysis are 
valuable tools for economists because they open up much richer sources of data about 
individuals and the information sets available to decisionmakers for use with 
traditional economic models. Both the measures of cosine similarity described in this 
section and Least Angle Regression, which is described in the subsequent section, are 
also easier to interpret than many other tools from computational linguistics.  
This section gives some background and description of the algorithm used in this 
paper for measuring similarity between submissions and journals’ corpora of 
published papers. The subsequent section describes additional methods for building a 
predictor of the number of citations a paper will receive based on first-round referee 
comments. 
4.1    Measuring Textual Similarity 
Measures of textual similarity have been widely used by computer scientists for a 




Phillips (2010) measure cosine similarity between the texts of thousands of 10-K 
filings to show that firms with higher similarities are not only more likely to merge 
but also show higher post-merger increases in revenue. Here, I use cosine similarity 
to measure how closely related each submission is to past accepted work at the 
journal, which I will employ as a proxy for fit. 
In order to evaluate textual similarity between papers, I first store a term 
frequency vector, kt

, for each submission, , containing the frequencies, , of all 
terms  appearing in the submission. I store frequencies of all three-word terms of at 
least twelve characters occurring in at least two submissions: 
= ⋮( )  
To measure textual similarity between any two papers, I use the cosine similarity 
between their term-frequency vectors (Salton and McGill, 1983) which is defined as 
the angle between the term frequency vectors representing the documents. This can 
be measured using the length normalized dot-product of their term frequency vectors, 
 and : 
 
 
Cosine similarity is one of the most commonly applied measures used in 
computational linguistics (see Sebastiani, 2002 for an example) both for its simple 
interpretation and its simple normalization which provides a natural control for 
document length. Note that because of the length-normalization in the formula above, 


























similarity between each pair of papers is bounded between zero (no textual overlap) 
and 1 (all terms in each document occur in the other).  
Appendix F shows the distribution of cosine similarity across all pairs of paper 
submissions and accepted paper submissions received in 2009 at Journals 1 through 
5. These similarities are calculated based on all one-word terms that occur in at least 
two manuscripts. As these graphs show, the average cosine similarity between two 
submissions to the same journal is between 4.9%-8.6% depending on the journal, 
with the average being slightly higher when limited only to accepted papers.  
In order to accommodate the fact that a journal’s niche reflects not just a singular 
paper but rather a corpus of somewhat loosely related past publications, I average 
each submission’s similarity across all papers  accepted at the journal from the 
previous year to measure overall fit. Because pair-wise similarities are restricted 
between 0 and 1, this method provides a measure of relation to the niche recently 
covered by the journal. 
= 1
where " "  is the number of papers " "  accepted at the journal the previous year 
 
In addition to storing term frequency vectors as described above, I also store all 
occurrences of the last names of the journals’ primary coeditors in both earliest and 
latest revisions of all manuscripts for subsequent econometric analysis of niche and 




5. Modeling Impact using Referee Language & Other Determinants 
5.1    The LASSO Estimator and Model of Citation Impact 
Like many facets of products and securities which we send and receive signals 
about and which we would like to forecast, the number of citations a paper will 
receive is challenging to predict empirically because the factors we hypothesize to 
affect impact outcomes -- things like whether a paper contains novel content, is 
written on a hot topic of the moment, or challenges previous seminal work -- are 
traditionally hard to measure explicitly.  
In order to address this measurement problem, I exploit the text of referee reviews 
written about papers at the time of submission which comment on a paper’s relevance, 
merits and other characteristics. Casting a broad net on language that could be 
meaningful, I examine one- to three-word phrases of at least four characters in the 
earliest available versions of referee reports and comments to editors. By restricting 
these phrases to those that occur in at least fifteen referee evaluations, I minimize the 
possibility that these phrases predict citations just by singling out individual papers. 
At Journal 4, this leaves 5,724 terms used by referees to describe at least fifteen 
papers. 
While the text of these reviews provides a rich source of information on 
observable characteristics of papers that might otherwise be difficult to measure, they 
introduce a statistical challenge in that the number of possible predictors far exceeds 
the number of observations. In order to select the most informative predictors of 




selection method called Least Angle Regression (LAR) for fitting referee language 
and other paper characteristics to citation impact.  
Like AIC and BIC methods, which are commonly used in economics and finance 
for lag selection in time-series models and fall under the same class of L1 models, 
Least Angle Regression uses shrinkage to force some coefficients towards zero, 
thereby punishing the model for over fitting. LAR fits coefficients  to a linear 
regression on  that is quite similar to ordinary least squares (OLS) except that in 
addition to minimizing the sum of the squares of the residuals, there is an additional 
constraint that the sum of the absolute values of the coefficients must be less than 
some shrinkage parameter, , or alternatively a fixed fraction  of the OLS 
coefficients : 
= argmin −     subject to ≤ ≡  
 
As described by Tibshirani (1996), the parameter  (or alternatively ) controls 
the amount of shrinkage by constraining the number of predictors permitted in the 
model and the size of their coefficients. Values of ∈ (0,1) will always result in 
some amount of shrinkage, but the appropriate level can be estimated based on cross-
validation or analytical estimation of overfitting risks. Tibshirani also describes a 
number of consistent computational heuristics for estimating LAR models, including 
LASSO (for ‘least absolute shrinkage and selection operator’), which I use to estimate 




on each predictor, adding to the model the predictor that is most highly correlated 
with the residuals, subject to the shrinking constraint. Taking this first predictor as a 
given in the model, LASSO proceeds to recalculate the residuals with a second 
coefficient on each remaining predictor, again adding the predictor that is most highly 
correlated with the dependent variable at that step, repeating until the shrinking 
constraint becomes binding. 
Besides addressing concerns about overidentification, additional benefits of using 
the LASSO are that the model provides coefficients with greater accuracy (lower 
variances) than OLS and which are much more easily interpretable than those 
proposed by many machine learning models which might perform as well. The results 
from the first stage of the LASSO can be used to evaluate how informative different 
predictors are on their own, as described in the following two subsections. 
As discussed by Tibshirani, since the LASSO estimate is a non-linear and non-
differentiable function of the response values for a fixed value of  or , it is difficult 
to obtain an accurate estimate of its standard error. To estimate an acceptable range of 
values for , I estimate the prediction error for the LASSO procedure by five-fold 
cross-validation as described in Efron and Tibshirani (1993), noting the value of ̂ 
that minimizes the prediction error ( ̂=.22, Cross-Validated PE=34). See Appendix G 
for a diagram. While Efron and Tibshirani recommend setting = ̂, a more 
conservative approach is to treat their value as an upper bound for . Willey (2011) 
recommends selecting a value of  that falls somewhere below ̂ but above the 
minimal value with an MSE within a standard error of ̂. For the sake of parsimony 




singling out individual papers, I choose a conservative value of = 0.088 which lies 
at the lower bound of this range and which in my model, permits 20 predictors.  
The coefficient path for this regression is shown in Appendix H. In general, 
coefficient paths for LASSO need not be smooth or monotone because the best subset 
of predictors of size n need not be contained in the best subset of size n+1. If the 
process of adding predictors to the LASSO is singling out individual papers, we 
would expect to see many coefficients’ values and signs oscillating as predictors are 
added and subtracted to single out unique papers with significant numbers of 
citations. Instead, in the model of citation impact, all coefficient paths are continuous 
and show minimal oscilation (only one of the twenty coefficients ever changes 
direction and none change sign), once again alleviating concerns that predictors could 
be singling out individual papers. 
The OLS Adjusted R2 can also be used to assess the goodness of the LASSO fit. 
Using referee language and submission date4, the LASSO model predicts 62% of 
variation in the number of citations received by published, accepted papers. I can 
conclude that via the LASSO, referee language and submission date together provide 
an informative, early-stage signal of citation impact that can be calculated for both 
published and unpublished papers and used in subsequent analysis of editorial 
                                                 
4 Interestingly, I find that when modeling impact, estimating a coefficient on the date on which the 
submission was received is more significant than the date on which the submission was accepted. This 
may reflect a trend in certain fields such as economics and finance, of authors broadcasting working 
versions of papers which can get cited, sometimes long before they get accepted at any journal. It is 





decisions. Although in theory, published papers may reflect a selection bias, this can 
be controlled for by using referee scores, which are also available. See section 6 for 
results and a further analysis of this approach.  
5.2 Relationship Between Referee Score and Impact 
Since the LASSO captures information about citation impact from referee 
comments, it seems relevant to consider how much of this information is also 
captured in referee scores (i.e. referee recommendations to accept, strong reject, weak 
revise, resubmit etc.). Regressing referee score and submission date on citations 
yields an adjusted R2 of just 0.05 compared to an adjusted R2 of 0.62 from the 
LASSO on referee language and submission date. Put differently, this means that 
referee scores and submission date alone capture just 5% of the variation in citations 
whereas the LASSO considering text of referee comments captures 62% of this 
variation. This suggests that referees both have and broadcast, whether knowingly or 
otherwise, more information on a submission’s citation impact than they incorporate 
into scores. This could reflect either or both a limitation in the bandwidth of scores 
for communicating information and/or referees who (whether strategically or through 
ignorance) do not consider this citation information entirely relevant to scoring 
recommendations. 
To conduct a deeper analysis of how informativeness of a predictor of score 
relates to its informativeness on citations and vice versa, we can revisit the first-stage 
LASSO results from the previous section, combining them with additional first-stage 




LASSO is equivalent to estimating a separate OLS regression on each referee term. In 
order to control for the possibility that older papers have more time during which to 
accumulate citations as well as time trends in scoring, I also control for submission 
date. I conduct two regressions for each of the referee terms considered in the 
previous analysis, which yields estimated values of , , , , , and   for 
5,724 values of j: ( ) = + ( ) + ( ) +       for each term  (  ) = + ( ) + ( ) +       for each term  
The significance and informativeness of each referee term in predicting citations and 
scores, respectively, can be interpreted based on its normalized coefficients, γ /α  and φ /μ , and from the p-values of the coefficients γ  and φ . The results showing the 
relationship between γ  and  are graphed in Appendix I. As described below, these 
demonstrate (1) that the informativeness of referee language about citation impact is 
poorly or not-at-all correlated with informativeness about referee score and (2) that 
referee terms contain more information about both citations and referee scores than 
would be expected at random. 
The upper left panel of Appendix I shows a plot of the raw coefficients  verus γ . The R2 of their relationship is 0.03, reflecting very low correlation. The right-hand 
panels show plots of the p-values of the same coefficients.  The lower two panels 
show plots by rank order, which captures each term’s order of importance relative to 
others, spreading out the data points evenly much like a log-log plot and making it 
easier to view very large and very small values on one plot. The low correlation (R2 




most revealing about the lack of correlation between terms’ informativeness in 
predicting score versus citations. Despite this lack of correlation, a careful look at this 
plot shows a higher density of terms at very significant p-values (≤0.05) on both axes, 
demonstrating that a larger number of terms are statistically significant predictors of 
either citations or scores than would be expected at random. This result can be seen 
even more clearly in the frequency distributions of p-values shown in Appendix J, 
which show that the cumulative density of p-values ≤ 0.05 (and particularly those 
below 0.025) are two to three times higher than would be expected at random. In 
other words there are several times as many terms that are significant predictors of 
score and citations than we would expect at random. 
Given the breadth of p-values across both score and citation predictions, it is clear 
that different referee phrases carry different amounts of information about predicted 
citations than about predicted scores, especially considering that each term plotted 
was applied in at least fifteen referee evaluations. As a result, I conclude that 
information contained in referee language about referee scores is mostly not 
coincident with amount of information about citations. Accordingly, the LASSO 
predictor of eventual citations can be employed together with first-stage referee 
scores as signals on largely different facets of a submission’s quality. 
5.3   Referee Language Predictors of Impact and Referee Scores 
The intermediate LASSO results from OLS on individual terms in the previous 
subsection highlight some interesting referee language that are significant predictors 




interpret than most machine learning models, their interpretation still has its limits. 
Before diving into individual terms and conclusions about the meaning and direction 
of their significance, some standard caveats that apply to natural language processing 
must be noted on interpretation of this portion of the analysis. 
Many factors might affect a referee’s decision to use a phrase to describe a paper. 
Although modeling these factors explicitly is beyond the scope of this paper, it is 
helpful to consider various mechanisms that could affect referee language when 
interpreting individual term results. Some terms could convey multiple meanings 
depending on their context or nearby textual qualifiers. For example “errors” could be 
used to refer to mistakes present in a submission or to standard errors from a 
regression analysis that authors perform. Likewise, the term “interesting” could reflect 
a completely different sentiment when qualified with a negative term as in “not very 
interesting.” The bar for calling a paper “nice” may differ from one reviewer to the 
next. Referees in certain niches may also be more likely to use certain terms than 
others, so that the significance of a term actually reflects a paper’s fit within a 
particular niche that is more highly cited rather than referee sentiment. Furthermore, 
the 5,724 referee terms evaluated will certainly not subsume every sentiment that 
referees may convey in their reviews. Some sentiments may require complex 
language that could be phrased in multiple ways and/or take more than three words to 
describe. Significance of sentiments conveyed through multiple phrasing variations 
could be diluted, for example, if each variation is applied in fewer than fifteen 
evaluations. Altogether, these characterize just a few of the reasons that even the most 




Major advances by computational linguists during the last five years have resulted 
in a large quantity of new methods aimed at tackling the types of challenges described 
above within specific contexts; for example, search engines typically infer a user’s 
intention from a term such as “jaguar” based on the user’s geographic location and the 
co-ocurrence of other words like “zoo” or “F-Type 2013” in the search query. 
However, tuning algorithms to correct for turns of phrase is still at least as much an 
art of balancing countervailing signals as it is a science. These more complex 
algorithms typically require a great deal of tailoring to detect language constructs, 
synonyms and context specific to each corpus. An algorithm for detecting context in 
search engine queries will differ substantially from one tailored to technical patent 
citations, twitter feeds, financial news or referee evaluations. Not only do more 
advanced algorithms typically require much larger datasets for training, often under 
supervised learning methods where the researcher or evaluator of the model plays a 
hand in identifying and extracting salient features, but they can conflate artifacts from 
multiple subalgorithms into one metric making their results harder to interpret as 
well. Consequently, a simple initial textual analysis like the one presented here is 
usually a first step towards developing tailored metrics on textual corpora and has the 
benefit of more clearly (if not perfectly) interpretable results. 
In order to address these limitations on interpreting individual term results, I 
restrict the discussion below to only those terms whose occurrence alone is a 
significant predictor of citations or referee score at the 10% level or better. As 
discussed previously, each of these appears in at least fifteen evaluations also. While 




meaning that with 90% certainty or better, their presence corresponds to a concept or 
sentiment that predicts scores or citations—it may be easier to identify the story and 
reasoning for why some terms are significant drivers of scores or citations than 
others. The formulation of the OLS regressions helps simplify interpretation; since 
only one referee term is included in each regression, it is possible to evaluate 
differences in context by comparing coefficients and significance across variants of 
phrases (eg. “interesting” and “be interesting to”). In addition, I use [square brackets] 
in the discussion below to highlight the phrases that most commonly precede or 
follow significant terms to aid the reader’s interpretation of the results where 
applicable. Ultimately, the contribution of this analysis is that it identifies concepts 
that are significant predictors of scores and citations. It is a useful tool for identifying 
theories for further discussion and investigation. 
With these caveats in mind, the results of the submission-date-controlled first-
stage LASSO from the previous section highlight some interesting themes and trends 
among significant referee language. See Appendix K for results from a sample of 
significant terms. Positive predictors of citations include terms that point to a 
submission’s contribution to some ongoing debate, such as “debate,” “doubt” and 
“argue that the” or to topics of public interest, such as “public” and “government.” 
Likewise, referee language that suggests a submission is written on a hot topic or at 
least one in which there is an existing literature tend to receive more citations (eg. 
“literature has,” “the existing literature,” “this literature”) but also lower referee scores 
(eg. “literature has,” “competing,” “related,” “related to,” and “well-known”). Language 




literature, also predicts greater citations (eg. “extends,” “the most important 
[contribution],” “would be interesting,” “the contribution,” “the major [innovation],” 
“value of the,” and “the authors propose”). The term “from [year] to[year]” which 
occurs when a referee is characterizing a unique dataset used in a paper also reflects a 
kind of submission novelty that significantly and positively predicts citations.  
Referee advice for revising a paper can sometimes indicate greater citations (eg. 
“the authors need,” “the current version,” “would be interesting,” and “highlight”) but 
also not surprisingly, lower scores indicating greater room to improve in the first 
round (“be helpful to” and “authors should”). Conditional on being accepted, it seems 
that some referee suggestions do improve the citation impact of papers as Laband 
theorizes or at least highlight aspects of citateability that can be improved with 
revision, as discussed by Ellison. 
Some referee terms raise concerns and potential shortcomings in a submission. 
These tend to predict lower scores (eg. “problems of,” “problems with the,” 
“problematic,” “assumes that,” “did not,” “do not see,” “they do not,” “misleading,” “not 
clear,” “unclear,” “assumptions,” “the assumption that,” “assumes that,” “not seem to,” 
“not allow,” and “not understand the”) and almost all of these also predict lower 
citations. Only “unclear” is a positive, statistically significant predictor of citations, 
which could again reveal a productive and addressable referee comment that 
ultimately leads to improvements in the paper and more citations in the long run. 
Language that connotes the referee’s opinion can be much trickier to interpret. 
Positive terms (eg. “nice paper,” “think the authors,” “important,” “sensible,” “I agree,” 




citations and, more rarely, significant positive predictors of referee scores (eg. 
“sophisticated,” “nicely,” and “minor [concern]”). Likewise, negative phrases (eg. 
“rejection,” “I am not,” and “I do not”) are negative indicators of score and in the case 
of “rejection” a negative indicator of citations also. However, it is especially important 
to understand context in interpreting polarizing (i.e. positive and negative) terms 
because these are likely to occur in the presence of qualifiers which could reverse 
their meanings quite easily. 
Interestingly, referees’ use of the term “interesting” is predictive of lower scores 
on average but not a significant predictor of citations. Anecdotal discussion with 
several referees indicates that this may be a term used by referees who can not 
identify anything positive to say but feel uncomfortable using explicitly negative 
language. Indeed, the term “interesting” is usually followed by “but” or “however” 
later in the sentence. In contrast, the term “be interesting to,” which suggests a referee 
has identified valuable extensions to a submission, is predictive of higher citations but 
is not a significant predictor of referee scores. 
Finally, a number of significant terms characterize the topic of a paper. Although 
it is difficult to discuss these here without compromising the identity of the journal, it 
is worthwhile to note that “[editor-in-chief’s last name] and” appears as a positive 
significant predictor of citation impact here and in the final LASSO model. 
Examination of these occurences reveals that this language typically describe an 
extension or application of previous work by the editor-in-chief and coauthors. This 




than average and (2) provides support for the idea that coeditors are selecting for 
more impactful work in the editor-in-chief’s area of expertise. 
One way to maximize the usefulness of these results is to use them to identify 
data points that could be built into future online editorial (and non-editorial) 
information collection systems -- such as checkboxes that referees could tick to 
indicate unique datasets and other types of impact predictors, as well as 
autocomputed measures of relevance to a journal’s niche -- to promote transparency 
in evaluating review systems while protecting the identity and privacy of 
stakeholders. 
5.4    Other Predictors of Publication Impact 
Beyond referee language, I also look at other predictors of a published 
submission’s citation impact including paper characteristics and editor fixed effects. 
Appendix L shows results from an OLS of citation impact on submission 
characteristics of published papers. Positive coefficients on both earliest and latest 
version manuscript length show that longer papers at this journal go on to garner three 
more citations per one thousand words in earliest submitted versions of manuscripts 
and an additional 0.5 more citations per thousand words in the last revision of the 
manuscript. One interpretation of the significance of both coefficients is that editors 
and referees facilitate shorter lengths in final versions of less impactful papers while 
authors (at least those of work that is eventually published) also face compatible 
incentives at submission time, submitting shorter papers on average when there is less 




Results of regressing citations on editor fixed effects and mentions of editor 
names are shown in Appendix M. Editors are numbered based on the number of 
submissions they have overseen, with the Editor-in-chief and Editor 1 each 
overseeing the most submissions and Editor 12 overseeing the fewest. Due to small 
sample sizes, fixed effects were excluded for Editors 10-12. Editor fixed effects vary 
in magnitude and significance. A few possible reasons are that some editors do a 
better job of selecting more impactful papers, place higher weight on impact over 
fit/accuracy, or they simply are assigned papers in less cited areas. Cherkashin et al 
(2009) hypothesize that an editor-in-chief may cherry pick better papers for 
his/herself or favored editors. At Journal 4, however, the coefficient on the Editor-in-
chief’s fixed effect variable is near the middle of the range for all editors, suggesting 
that s/he is not cherry picking most impactful articles for his/herself. 
Mentions of the Editor-in-chief’s last name and Editor 1’s last name in the final 
versions of manuscripts are significant predictors of eventual citations. For the Editor-
in-chief, the effect of being mentioned in a published submission is just over one 
more citation on average and highly significant at the 1% level. One interpretation is 
that papers closer to the Editor-in-chief’s work get more visibility, perhaps because a 
large number of readers interested in that line of research pay attention to the journal 
or because the Editor-in-Chief’s research is in a highly cited area. For Editor 1, the 
effect is negative and still significant at the 5% level suggesting that this editor’s 
research might fall into a less cited niche. The less-than-significant fixed effects for 
mentions of other coeditors could be a result of the smaller sample sizes or could 




Interactions between coeditors and mentions of coeditor names are not significant, 
except in the case of the Editor-in-chief where the effect is significant and negative 
(though still slightly smaller in magnitude than the coefficient on mention of the 
Editor-in-chief’s name). This tells us that on average, published papers mentioning 
the Editor-in-chief that were assigned to coeditors are more impactful than those 
assigned to the Editor-in-chief him/herself.  Accordingly, we can conclude the greater 
citations received by papers in the Editor-in-chief’s own niche are not primarily a 
result of his/her own greater but rather some mechanism that acts primarily through 
coeditors. The larger numbers of citations received by papers mentioning the Chief 
Editor could instead be due to the readership s/he draws or his/her ability to draw 
coeditors able to select for more impactful papers in this niche, via referees they 
select or otherwise. Alternatively, it is possible the Editor-in-chief is strategically 
chosen by the Journal publisher to be aligned with its current readership. In either 
case, these results provide evidence that the Editor-in-chief plays an important role 
and signal for establishing impact through the journal’s readership and/or human 
capital. 
6. Investigating Trends in Referee Behavior 
This section presents results on predictors of referees’ decision to refer and their 
scoring decisions. Understanding referee behavior is a key part of understanding the 
editorial process in that it tells us about the signals and information captured in 





In Appendix N, Table 1 shows the results of a binomial logit of revision round 
and number of previous reviews completed by the referee on referees’ decision to 
refer. Referees are more likely to agree to review later revisions of a paper, perhaps 
because they are more invested in the paper by that point and because less work is 
required. However, referees that have completed more reviews are significantly more 
likely to decline additional submissions. Whatever the returns to refereeing, they 
seem to diminish slightly on the margin of reviewing another paper for the same 
journal. These results suggest editors at Journals 1 through 4 face constraints on the 
amount of referee capital they have and support Laband’s hypothesis that editors must 
spend effort matching reviewers to submisions who will raise the quality of these 
submissions to the extent possible. In contrast, at Journal 5, the estimated coefficients 
on the previous referee reviews are not significant, which may reflect less exhausted 
or more committed referee resources. 
Results from a multinomial logit on referee-assigned scores across Journals 1 
through 5 are shown in Appendix M.2. Referees at Journals 1 through 3 and 5 
generally assign lower scores over the course of time when controlling for number of 
past revisions. The exception is Journal 4 where referees grade slightly but 
significantly more generously with time. This effect disappears, however, when the 
analysis is restricted to first revisions only and controls for a reviewers’ total reviews 
are removed (see Table O and its discussion below). The negative coefficient on total 
reviews everywhere except Journal 5 suggests that either referees grade more harshly 
later in their tenures or that referees who are selected for and agree to review more 




The estimated coefficients on length are significant and negative in all journals. 
This could mean that referees prefer shorter papers, or it could reflect greater effort 
and revision rounds devoted to editing down final versions of papers that go on to be 
accepted. Subsequent results on editorial preference for length help to detangle these 
alternatives, providing support for the former explanation. 
Finally, coefficients on average similarity to previous years’ accepted papers vary 
in sign and significance across journals. One interpretation is that at some journals 
referees may take a greater interest in whether a submission fits the relevant niche, 
while at others referees may be concerned with broadening the journal’s niche. These 
results suggest that it is important to interpret the results regarding referee preferences 
in a journal-specific context. 
Appendix O gives a more in-depth look at first-round referee evaluations at 
Journal 4. As discussed in the previous section, there is a significant and negative 
coefficient on submission receipt date in this specification, reflecting greater 
selectivity by referees over time on first-round submissions. 
Coefficients on editor fixed effects are all positive and significant but vary in 
magnitude. One explanation is that the quality of papers may vary across editors 
and/or their field specialties. An alternative explanation is that put forth by Laband 
that some editors consistently do a better job of matching referees who are able to 
improve the quality of marginal papers. It is also possible that referees in certain 




7. Results from Editorial Decision Analysis 
Results from a series of binomial logits on ultimate editorial decisions to accept or 
reject submissions at Journal 4 are shown in Appendix P. As discussed previously, 
positive scores are defined as any type of accept or revise and resubmit 
recommendation by a referee while any type of reject recommendation is considered 
negative. As the results of the first two regressions show, the LASSO-generated 
E[citations] is not a significant predictor of editorial decisions when considered by 
itself. However, the third and fourth regressions show that there is in fact a significant 
interaction between E[citations] and both the number of positive and negative scores 
received in the first round. The fourth regression shows that the number of first-round 
positive and negative scores received by submissions are quite significant on their 
own, although their interactions with E[citations] also continue to be significant in 
this specification. The fifth regression shows that these effects persist when 
controlling for E[citations], although the positive interaction loses significance. 
Additional point estimate analyses of significance presented in Appendix P are 
consistent with these findings. 
Coefficients on the cosine similarity measure of fit within a journal’s niche are 
also significant here and in the point estimate analysis. When available, a 
submission’s fit (that is, its cosine similarity to previous year’s accepted papers) is a 




variable fit_flag controls for the availability of manuscripts for textual analysis5, 
taking on a value of one when a measure of fit is available and zero otherwise.  
These results are quite fascinating for several reasons: First they show that both 
the LASSO-generated predictor of citations and cosine similarity measure of fit 
isolate information from textual content that plays a role in editorial decisions beyond 
what is captured in referee scores. Secondly, it suggests that citations play a more 
complicated role in editorial incentives and submission quality than the literature 
typically assumes. For papers with consistently positive scores, citations are a 
positive predictor of editorial decisions. However, for submissions with more mixed 
reviews, citeability is an increasingly negative predictor of acceptance6. Given that 
referee scores seem to serve as a signal on quality, these results characterize a risk 
aversion on the part of editors to publishing high impact marginal-scoring work and 
an affinity for publishing well-scoring high impact papers. Further investigation 
shows that these interactions also become more pronounced in later rounds, 
presumably because more information or stronger signals about the manuscript are 
revealed in each round. 
Discussion of these results with the editorship of these journals elicited comments 
that validated and illuminated these findings. I was told that as publishers struggle to 
turn profits by bundling journal subscriptions (which are measured in pages) for sale 
                                                 
5 As discussed in Section 3, some manuscripts could not be converted to raw text because of the 
format in which they were received. 
6 As shown in Appendix D and discussed in Section 3, submissions that received only negative 




to libraries, editors face increasing pressure to avoid “thin, anemic” issues and must 
therefore censor preferences on other aspects of a paper including novelty and citation 
impact “as long as the science is technically correct.” In other words, editors are more 
concerned with protecting the journals and themselves from the embarrassment of 
technical errors than limiting publications to just the most novel or high impact 
content. One editor pointed out that increasing competition from online and fee-for-
publication journals which generate both revenue and significant citations as a result 
of being open access further complicates and exacerbates these incentives. 
I also carried out a binary logit of editorial decisions with fixed effects for each 
coeditor. Results from this analysis are included in Appendix Q. The significant 
variation between fixed effects, particularly for Editors 3, 4, and 5 suggests that there 
are differences between editors, either in the quality of the submissions they receive 
or in their standards or the publication quotas they aim to meet.  
Results of editor fixed effect interactions with mentions of the assigned editor’s 
name in the final version of the manuscript are included in Appendix R. Only the 
interaction for Editor 1 is significant. The results indicate that Editor 1 is more likely 
to accept papers with his/her name in the last version but also that those papers also 
go on to get cited more, though the latter effect is not highly significant. This editor 
may be attracting more high impact work to the journal within his/her personal niche, 
making the case that the choice of coeditors is also important to the extent that they 
attract work within their niches. 
Appendix S shows additional results about editorial decisions across all five 




similarity to previous years’ accepted papers vary in sign and significance across 
journals. They are positive and significant at Journals 1, 2, and 4. The results 
suggesting that at these journals, editors take a greater interest in whether a 
submission fits the relevant niche and, once again, underscore the importance of 
regarding findings about editorial preferences in a journal-specific context. These 
regressions also show that unlike referees who prefer shorter papers, editors have a 
positive preference for submission length in earliest versions of manuscripts, perhaps 
a result of the publication incentives described above. 
8. Summary and Conclusion 
This study makes contributions both to economic methodology, by establishing a 
framework in which raw textual information can be captured and employed to add 
power to economic models, and in extending the understanding of editorial incentives 
in the literature, particularly how a submission’s citeability may signal a kind of risk. 
One important takeaway for authors submitting papers, at least at certain journals, is 
that if results are controversial, unique, applicable to ongoing debates or otherwise 
likely to yield more attention, then it may be especially critical to expend extra effort 
into ensuring referee-friendly, accurate results and clearly demonstrating that 
accuracy. Alternatively, an author submitting marginal results might be able to 
successfully progress through the review process by making the work less attention-
grabbing in order to fill editors’ need for more papers without attracting the kind of 
attention that editors may be risk averse to. Future work could examine whether these 




citations and those rejected ones for which referee language predicts more citations) 
actually receive more editorial attention as measured in review times, number of 
assigned referees, and number of referee rounds.  
The model of citation impact developed here also sheds light on journal-specific 
factors that drive citations, offering some measurable answers to the long-standing 
question of why some papers get cited more than others. For the journal investigated 
in greatest detail here, it seems that research employing unique datasets or of 
relevance to global topics, government applications or ongoing debates yields greater 
citations as does producing work in the journal’s niche, especially that of the editor-
in-chief. There is also some evidence that this latter mechanism operates in part via 
editors’ ability to better match submissions to referees who can suggest substantial 
improvements to those papers. By serving as a leader and figurehead, the Editor-in-
chief plays an important role in establishing impact through the journal’s readership 
and/or coeditor and referee capital. 
Although citations do not appear to enter editors’ decision to accept or reject a 
submission directly, there is evidence that they affect the amount of space devoted to 
a paper. Referees are more likely to agree to review shorter papers.  
It is important to note that these findings could be quite sensitive to the journal 
studied. In fact, the results show that journals’ editors and referees differ in the 
direction and significance of their preferences for a number of factors, including 
citation impact and textual similarity to past published articles. Furthermore, an 
extremely highly-ranked and broad-niche journal such as Science might not face the 




subscriptions. On the other hand, given the high public exposure of a journal like 
Science, its editors could face even greater sensitivity to risks from publishing less 
accurate work, even provided an already high bar on accuracy. Future work extending 
the citation analysis here on a broader cross-section of journals would highlight 
differences between journals and confirm how broadly applicable these results are. 
Altogether, these findings help to characterize the complex nature of a scholarly 
submission’s quality, indicating that for different editors quality has something to do 
with a combination of fit, technical merit and potential publication risks. In doing so, 
the findings also provide guidance on data points that could be built into future online 
editorial and other review systems -- such as checkboxes referees can tick for unique 
datasets and other types of impact predictors, and autocomputed measures of 
relevance to a journal’s niche -- to promote transparency in evaluating review systems 
while protecting the identity and privacy of stakeholders. 
This study also provides an example of how decision-makers who read reviews 
actively disambiguate and reintegrate information available in the reviews and 
summary ratings according to their own unique preferences rather than simply 
accepting (in this case, referees’) summary weighting of relevant signals. A takeaway 
for researchers studying review systems is not to rely solely on summary ratings that 
accompany reviews for a full understanding of signaling without carefully examining 
if there is sufficient evidence of homogeneity in the availability of information and 
weighting of factors among users and writers of reviews. 
Perhaps most importantly, the results demonstrate that it is possible for 




when there is some observable data available on these signals, even if it is quite 
limited, here for example data on actual citation impact of published papers. This is 
the first work to my knowledge to demonstrate the role of information measured from 
raw text in decision outcomes. Future work could extend these methods to 
understanding the role of reviews in different contexts, such as adoption of new 
restaurants or tastes for luxury housing features under different market conditions. 
Having better tools for extracting signal content in reviews also makes it possible to 
evaluate the sophistication, rationality and naivete of players in different contexts, for 
example measuring types of information ignored by decisionmakers or alternately 
segmenting decisionmakers by whether they consider certain types of information to 
make a contribution along the lines of behavioral economics even in the absence of 
controlled experiments. Applying these methods to other review contexts could also 












There is a growing body of recent literature in finance and economics covering 
various characteristics of the mortgage market and characterizing reasons for the market 
crash in 2008. Despite the slew of empirical results, as well as some theory for mortgage 
resale, there is limited literature characterizing the incentives that shape lender behavior 
at origination, particularly in a competitive framework. The focus of this paper is to 
provide a theoretical framework for studying lender beliefs and behavior under 
competition with asymmetric information and to characterize effects on borrower 
preferences, loan quality and resale. The model makes a number of predictions that are 
consistent with empirical findings from Loutskina and Strahan (2010) and Panetta (2009) 
outlined below and provides a basis for evaluating lending mechanisms and proposed 
regulation. 
Loutskina and Strahan argue that geographically diversified (concentrated) mortgage 
lenders act as uninformed (informed) investors, with concentrated firms accepting more 
applications, performing better in the market for jumbo loans, retaining more mortgages 
and making more profit off each mortgage while diversified lenders do the opposite. The 
authors find evidence that concentrated lenders were much better able to time resale of 
mortgages prior to geographic market crashes, so that as a result, their stock prices fell 
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less between 2007-2008. Both across time and across geography, the share of 
concentrated lenders is negatively correlated with the run-up to the housing market crash. 
Thus, the authors argue that this lack of investment in information production by 
diversified lenders played a role in the market crash. 
Although their work is not focused on mortgage markets, Panetta et al (2009) exploit 
data from borrowing by Italian firms to show that mergers between lenders improve the 
correspondence between borrower risk and interest rate. Furthermore, they show that the 
size of this improvement is broadly similar for borrowers who prior to the merger 
borrowed from only one of the lenders and those who borrowed from both lenders 
involved in a merger deal. Their results suggest that mergers improve information 
available to the lenders involved and that this improvement is due not to a pooling of 
information but rather to improved abilities to process information by lenders. For the 
work presented here in this paper, these results suggest it is important to consider not just 
difference in the amount of information lenders have access to but also their ability to 
process this information. 
On the theoretical side, Bleck and Gao (2010) develop a framework for evaluating 
different information accounting practices in the loan resale market. They focus 
especially on mark-to-market (MTM) accounting, showing that while MTM is intended 
to increase information available on the market, it presents opportunities for firms to 
exploit this information, thereby changing the reliability of information in the market and 
resulting in incentives to originate poorer loans, choose inefficient exposure to risk and 
damage price discovery. 
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Rajan (1992) characterizes preference for uninformed banks due to their lower 
enforcement abilities by firms financing risky projects. His model describes how the 
incentives to exert effort by a borrower are drastically reduced when an informed lender 
places the threat of intervention, leading to inefficiency and borrower preference for 
uninformed lending. While this work characterizes borrower performance and choice 
between informed and uninformed lenders, the lenders in the model develop offers in 
isolation from each other. There is still a need for a framework for these lenders to 
actually form beliefs about and compete with one another. 
While these results are compelling and timely, they also point to the importance of 
developing an appropriate theory for lender behavior. Much of the discussion of lender 
incentives provided in the literature assumes that lenders value borrowers in isolation 
with no perceived or actual interaction with other lenders despite acknowledging that 
borrowers do in fact select between offers from multiple lenders. 
The economic foundations underpinning this financial literature go back to work on 
signaling and equilibria in markets with incomplete or asymmetric information. Akerlof 
(1970) and Spence (1973 1974a, 1974b) with later contributions from Stiglitz (1974), 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1975) and Riley (1975, 1976) show that equilibrium in markets 
with asymmetric information and signalling may have quite different properties from 
equilibrium with no information transfer or with direct, costless information transfer. 
Signalling equilibria may not always exist, might not be sustainable, and may be 
economically inefficient. 
In their seminal work on information asymmetries in financial markets, Leland and 
Pyle (1977) consider the same general class of financing projects considered within this 
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paper where quality is commonly valued and highly variable; but they do so the context 
of entrepreneurial ventures. They find that when moral hazard prevents information-
sharing across informed and uninformed lenders, indirect information can come in the 
form of entrepreneurs who are willing to invest in their own projects.  
In the context of mortgages, lenders generally prefer to see borrowers who place 
larger down payments in much the same vein; however, there are many cases in which 
the borrower may be heavily cash-constrained and thereby limited in his ability to signal 
any private information he has about being a good investment. Lenders face the problem 
of distinguishing these borrowers from low-type borrowers. Furthermore, borrowers may 
not be fully informed about their future likelihood of repayment and might have even less 
information about the market’s effects on their likely repayment than informed lenders 
do. When concentrated and diversified lenders compete against each other, there is 
indirect information-sharing involved in the competitive process which is important to 
take into account in modelling lender incentives. 
Part of the challenge in modelling information revelation and accounting mechanisms 
in a lending market is that players are constantly updating information about each other 
from each other’s actions. It is therefore important to consider how lenders derive 
information from their beliefs about each other and to understand which conclusions are 
robust to equilibria in which lenders fully exploit available information or to other 
factors. Do lenders make offers expecting that they are competing with one or more other 
lenders? Do they set offers rationally screening borrowers on added information that may 
come from a borrower’s accepting their offers or do they give naive offers based solely 
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on their priors? It is important to understand the implications of each of these scenarios 
for lender behavior and for evaluating regulatory proposals. 
As discussed, the focus of this paper is to address the role of competition and its 
interaction with asymmetric noisy information in a mortgage market. Here we will focus 
primarily on developing a theoretical framework for comparing the behavior of 
concentrated and diversified firms and deriving implications from it. Lenders form 
expectations about borrowers prior to origination that are updated at origination based on 
the level of competition in the market. If lenders do not behave naively, equilibrium 
offers take this ex post learning into account and yield results that are generally consistent 
with existing empirical literature: Higher-quality borrowers prefer informed lenders 
whereas the lowest quality borrowers prefer uninformed lenders. Informed lenders are 
better able to distinguish between highest quality borrowers for jumbo loans. And lastly, 
competition improves the amount of information in the origination market for both 
informed and uninformed lenders. However, I also find evidence that lenders may face 
incentives to deliberately make naive offers that do not take ex post learning and 
additional information processing into account if they expect to resell loans and are able 
to do so without revealing ex post information. This finding enlightens and supports those 
by Panetta et al, suggesting that post-merger lenders in their study should resell fewer 
loans post-merger. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: First, I introduce a basic model in 
section 2 that features heterogeneous borrower types, asymmetric information, and 
competition amongst two representative lenders. In Section 3, I derive some of the 
equilibrium characteristics of rational lenders’ beliefs and of loans made within this 
50 
 
framework. In Section 4, I provide a look at behavior of naive lenders when faced with 
competition against each other or against rational lenders of either type. The discussion in 
Section 5 addresses the implications of the results for mortgage markets and discusses 
extensions for a framework in which there are more than two lenders and where lenders 
can sell off or securitize loans, concluding with ideas for extensions and further research. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 The Model 
In this model, borrowers are rational and seek loans to finance particular projects. 
They compare rates from concentrated and diversified lenders and choose the mortgage 
package with the highest net present value. For lenders facing competition, this amounts 
to a first-price common value simultaneous bid auction with noisy asymmetric 
information. 
2.1 Borrowers 
Each borrower  seeks financing for a project that he considers to be profitable and 
would like to undertake as long as he can obtain financing  with a net present value of at 
least . Without loss of generality, we assume here that = 0 so that the borrower will 
accept the best financing package  that he is offered such that 		0. If he accepts a 
financing offer, he signs a contract agreeing to make repayment subject to its terms. But 
after that fact, the actual repayment received by his lender will be subject to his 
idiosyncratic type . 
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In other words,  captures the net present value of the cash advance and repayment 
expected by the lender and borrower under the loan’s terms. It includes the interest rate, 
repayment term, and any other terms associated with the loan that affect the net present 
value of the net transfer from lender to borrower. 
Idiosyncratic variations across buyer-projects, such as the possibility of foreclosure, 
market fluctuations, and refinancing/repayment that occurs earlier or later than expected 
are all captured by . In other words, subject to the whims of nature and the market, a 
borrower will find it optimal repay a certain amount ex post, and  reflects how much 
that optimally chosen repayment varies from expectation. We assume that lenders’ 
contract enforcement mechanisms such as nasty letters, reductions to the borrower’s 
credit rating, and the possibility of foreclosure provide increasing disincentives for 
repayment shortfalls, so that a borrower does not find it optimal to repay substantially 
less than he is contractually obligated to repay, except in increasingly extreme states of 
nature. So, it is important to note that because repayments are optimally chosen within 
this framework, borrowers would never be able induce a better repayment just by posing 
as a lower type . 
There is a unit measure of borrowers on the market and nature distributes their types 
normally, according to: ~ℎ( ) = ( , )  which is known by all. We will assume 
that the mean borrower idiosyncrasy is = 0 for purposes of some illustrations of the 
treatment of the model, although the results are generalizable to other values of . A 
borrower’s type is not observable or contractible to lenders, and indeed a borrower may 
not fully know his own type when signing a contract.  
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In the discussion here and below, we consider the market for each borrower 
separately, so we omit the subscript  for each borrower. 
2.2 Lenders 
The primary difference between lenders in this model is the accuracy of their ability 
to predict borrowers’ types based on information that is available to them. Lenders come 
in two types: concentrated and diversified (denoted by subscripts  and  respectively), 
and each receives a noisy signal ( ) for each borrower’s idiosyncratic type: 
 	= 	 	 +	      where ~ ( ) = (0, )  and   = ,  
 
Because of their specialized knowledge of local markets and borrowers, concentrated 
lenders’ signals are more informative than those of diversified lenders, which we reflect 
by assuming that < . We further assume that the uncertainty of the lenders' signals 
(σc and σd) are known to all. 
For a given borrower and associated signal , lender  chooses a package of loan 
terms  to offer. Here,  reflects the lender’s net outlay in making a loan. Since 
borrowers and lenders are likely to have different outside costs of capital, we represent 
the net present value to the borrower of  as ( ) and make the assumption that (∙) is 
an increasing function so that for each additional dollar the lender spends on the net 
present cost of the loan, it can spend it in a way that increases the borrower’s preference 
for the loan. 
The lender chooses  in order to maximize the expectation of profits from that loan. 
Once realized, profits from an accepted loan offer  to borrower of type  equal the 
borrower’s idiosyncratic repayment  minus the net transfer  to the buyer. Loan offers 
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that are not accepted are neither costly nor profitable to the lender to make, as reflected in 
the expression for profit below: 
 
                                      = −       if ’s loan is accepted by the borrower. 
                                                0       if ’s loan offer is not accepted. 
 
In addition, we assume that lenders each have a very large supply of funds to invest in 
borrowers, such that they do not face wealth constraints. In other words, each lender 
could fund all borrowers if it so chose. 
Besides differences in type, a second possible difference between lenders is how they 
process the information that is available to them. Rational lenders make offers that take 
into account the additional signal they receive once they find out they have made the 
highest offer and won the borrower’s account; in this model, naive lenders, on the other 
hand, make offers based on their prior beliefs, ignoring this secondary information. I 
assume that all borrowers are rational in the main treatment of this model (here and in 
Section 3) then discuss behavior of and interactions between naive lenders in Section 4. 
Although naivete in this model is due to a lack of updating for secondary information on 
the borrower’s type, the results extend to other motivations for overvaluing a loan as well 
and are discussed in Section 5. 
2.3 Timing 
The model plays out in three periods. At time = 0, nature selects a type  for each 
borrower according to the known distribution ~ℎ( ) = ( , ). At time = 1, one 
or two representative firms  and  observe their respective signals  and  and make 
simultaneous offers,  and , for each borrower. At time = 2, each borrower selects 
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the lender that made the highest offer 	 ≥ 0. At some future date, = 3,  is revealed 
and profits for each lender are realized. Resale of loans, if it occurs, happens sometime in 
between times = 2 and = 3.  
 
3 Characterizing Lender Behavior and Equilibrium 
3.1 Lender Beliefs 
We begin characterizing the equilibrium in this loan market by considering the beliefs 
that the lenders form about each borrower. Unless given below, proofs for each 
proposition are presented in the appendix, as noted. 
 
Proposition 1: Lender i’s expectations about each borrowers’ type are an average of 
the mean borrower type ( ) and i’s private signal, ti, weighted by the relative reliability 
of each of these sources of information. In other words, lender i forms expected beliefs 
bi(ti) about each borrower’s type according to: ( ) ≡ [ | ] = (1 − ) ∙ + ∙        where 	 = +  [ | ] ≡ ( | ) = ( ( ), + ).  
 
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in the appendix. 
Note that in the expression above,  reflects the relative reliability of the lender’s 
signal  compared with the known population mean ( ) and distribution ( , ) of . 
For = 0, as the population distribution becomes relatively less dispersed ( ≪ ), 
 approaches zero, thereby diminishing the weight that  puts on his personal signal , 
pushing  towards ( ) ≈ 0. On the other hand, as the population distribution becomes 
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more dispersed, reflected in ≪ , we observe that  approaches unity and the lender 
relies almost solely on his private signal to form his beliefs ( ( ) ≈ ). 
 
Corollary 1 to Proposition 1: Lender c uses a higher weighting factor for its private 
signal than does lender d: 	> 	 	
 
This follows directly from the expression for  in Proposition 1 and our assumption 
that < . This result is intuitive because lender c knows how accurate his signal is 
and thus relies on it more than if the signal was more noisy, as it is for lender d. 
 
Corollary 2 to Proposition 1: For the same signal, lender c's beliefs are further from 
the mean  than lender d's beliefs: | ( ) − | > | ( ) − | 
 
This statement follows directly from C1.1 and the expression for ( ) in Proposition 
1. It reflects the diversified lender's propensity to make up for his more dispersed signal 







Proposition 2: Lender ’s beliefs about lender ’s signal  and beliefs  
For the same beliefs (bi = bj ≡ b), lender i’s expectations and distribution about j’s 
signal are the same as j’s expectations and distribution about i’s signal: | = = 	 | = 											(2.1) ( | = ) = [ | ], + + 											(2.2) 
For the same signal (ti = tj ≡ t), lender i’s expectations about j’s beliefs are the same 
as j’s expectations about i’s beliefs: | = = 	 | = 											(2.3) 
 
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in the appendix. We use this proposition as we 
think about how each lender forms expectations about outbidding the other, which play 
into its expected profits. 
Given this information, we can go on to characterize equilibrium belief formation, 
updating, offers and borrower behavior. 
3.2 Equilibrium 
Each lender  chooses its optimal offer ∗ in order to maximize its expected profits 
: [ | , ] = [ | , ] ∙ [ | , , ] 
 
Proposition 3: When they face no competitors, lenders will offer =  if they 
make any offer. 
 
In the absence of competition, [ | , ] = 1 for >  and [ | , , ] = −  so regardless of their type, lenders will always offer =
 to maximize profit as long as >  and will not make an offer otherwise. 
The situation is much more complicated when lenders compete because lenders need to 
form expectations on each other’s signals and beliefs to evaluate both [ 	] and [ ]. 
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3.2.1 Winner’s Curse and Belief Formation Under Competition 
Competition introduces the potential for winner’s remorse in our framework. 
Specifically, in a first price common value auction, there are at least two driver’s of 
“winner’s curse” that may occur, causing lenders to shade their offers compared to their 
expected valuations of the borrower = [ | ]. A third driver of winner’s curse can 
occur when at least one lender behaves naively, and is discussed in Section 4. The first 
two reasons for shading behavior are motivated by: 
1. Updated beliefs about ( | ): Winning means that the winning lender 
could have decreased its offer slightly and still won which is a strictly better 
outcome regardless of any other model parameters. This reasoning thus 
applies equally to concentrated and diversified lenders. 
2. Updated beliefs about : An outcome of win or lose contains an additional 
signal about the competitor’s beliefs on  that the winning lender could have 
used to update its own beliefs on . For any < ∞, a win indicates that 
competitors’ beliefs were lower than previously expected, thus resulting in a 
lower overall valuation of the borrower. A naive lender that does not heed this 
fact will find itself winning borrowers’ business ( [ | ] < ) that it does 
not want ex post to the bidding process.1 
In this section we will consider the effect of both of the first and second drivers of 
winner’s remorse in the design of rational lenders’ offers and borrower preferences. In 
the next section, we consider the behavior of lenders who for one reason or another 
                                                 




behave naively, in other words ignoring winner’s remorse of the second type described 
above. 
The amount of information revealed during a win/lose outcome can vary for each 
lender involved and depends on the informativeness of the lender’s prior ( | ) as well 
as the lender’s offer , and the type ( , ) of lenders competing. Since a lender’s prior on 
its competitors’ signal ( ) is always more noisy than its own signal ( | ), the 
lender’s update on that prior could still be quite noisy; even for a diversified lender 
competing with a concentrated one, the signal from winning over the concentrated lender 
could technically still be more noisy than its own signal. Propositions 4 and 5 
characterize this learning which occurs during the win/lose outcome. 
 
Proposition 4: Information Content of Winning Offers 
A winning offer brings with it information about the other lender’s signal . (We will 
show later that this information content increases as  falls): | , , < |  
 
This information content is illustrated in Figure 2, where ( ) reflects the lender’s 
own belief distribution on  and ( ) reflects the lender’s belief distribution about its 
competitor’s signal immediately prior to the win/lose outcome being revealed. 
Immediately upon winning with offer , lender  learns some additional information 
about ’s signal. Given his win, he knows that < ( ), which is equivalent to saying 
that  must be below whatever threshold = ( ) would have induced  to bid . In 
other words, winning truncates ’s prior ( ) to only the lefthand (shaded) portion of the 






Updating ’s prior results in an updated expected value for ’s believed distribution of 
 which is lower than his prior on :  | , = ∙ |( ) < ∙ | = |  
As a result, of its lower expectations about its competitors’ signal, the winning lender 
also updates its own beliefs to a lower value than previously expected: 
 
Proposition 5: Winning Lowers Lender Expectations of Borrower Type  
A winning offer lowers lender i’s beliefs about the borrower’s true type: ( | , , ) < ( | ) 
 
Specifically, the winning lender updates its expectation of the borrower’s type from  
to a weighted average of  and its updated beliefs about ’s prior beliefs | , , 
or equivalently, to a weighted average of the signals it now has access to: | , , 




( | , , ) = + | , (1 − )= + + | , , ∙= + + ∙ |( ) ∙  
where the weights  represent the weight that  places on each signal = { , , } 
and reflect the relative reliability of each signal: 
= + + 24 + 2 + 4 − ( )				 = +4 + 2 + 4 − ( ) 			and = 2 + +4 + 2 + 4 − ( )			 
Here, ( ) reflects the decrease in the variance of  due to its being truncated to the 
interval from (−∞	,	 ( )]  in the learning process that comes with winning.2 Because 
the amount of truncation decreases as  increases, we can observe that ( ) falls as  
increases, reflecting the fact that winning with a lower bid introduces more information to 
the lender. 
Regardless of ’s and ’s type(s) and depending on ( ), it is possible that either of 
 and  could be larger than the other. It is not possible to ascertain which will be 
higher because the amount of information in a winning offer varies with the offer itself. 
In other words, an offer that deviates further from the borrower’s expected beliefs carries 
more information because it truncates ’s prior |  by a larger amount. The trade-off 
for this higher information that is carried by a winning lower offer is of course that lower 
offers carry a lower probability of winning and generating information in the first place. 
Also, because a lender ’s signal on ’s signal is always more noisy than its own signal 
(variance is + +  compared to + ) there is no guarantee that the signal 
                                                 
2 See Barr (1999) for a derivation of variances for truncated normal distributions. 
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from the winning outcome against a concentrated lender has greater fidelity than a 
diversified lender’s own signal unless the diversified lender’s offer is sufficiently low to 
generate sufficiently high ( ). 
Nonetheless, it is possible to characterize the weight that a diversified or concentrated 
lender puts on its updated signal from the competitor upon winning. Because < , we 
can see that > . In other words, the weight  that lender  places on its 
competitor’s signal is higher if  is a diversified lender than a concentrated lender. 
Furthermore,  increases as  increases and also as any of the variables  , , and  
decrease. This result means that winning lowers a diversified lender’s expectations more 
than it does a concentrated lender’s expectations. Since optimal strategy in a first price 
common value auction is to place an ex ante bid that incorporates information from 
winning (Cox and Isaac, 1984), this yields Proposition 6. 
 
Proposition 6: Diversified Lenders Shade More than Concentrated Lenders 
In any competitive environment (i.e. regardless of lender types and of , , ), a 
diversified lender will shade its beliefs more than a concentrated lender does to reflect 
greater updating through the win/lose process. For a given offer l: 0 < ( | ) − ( | , , ) < ( | ) − ( | , , ) 
Since lenders seek to maximize profits according to the beliefs they will have if they win, 
(i.e. according to ( | , , )), for given prior beliefs : ( ) < ( ) 
 
3.2.2 Optimal Lender Behavior 
Note that ’s profit function if it wins takes the form: 
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[ | , , ] = ( | , , ) −= + + ∙ |( ) ∙ −  
So  selects  to maximize expected profit as follows: 
∗ [ | , ] = [ | , ] ∙ [ | , , ] = < ( ) ∙ [ | , , ]= < ( ) ∙ ( [ | , , ] − )= < ( )
∙ + + ∙ |( ) ∙ −
= |( )
∙ + + ∙ |( ) ∙ −  
Note that for given prior beliefs , a diversified lender will shade its expectation of 
beliefs conditional on winning more than a concentrated lender and thus will shade its 
optimal ∗ more accordingly as stated in Proposition 5.  
3.3 Aggregate Market Behavior 
We now have sufficient information about equilibrium offers from lenders of both 
types to characterize the aggregate behavior of this system. 
For the population of borrowers of a given type , we will see the following 
distribution of signals, ℎ( ) and ℎ( ), observed by concentrated and diversified lenders, 
respectively. Note that for illustrative purposes, we have chosen >  in the diagram 
below. Also, note that unlike the previous figures which showed belief distributions for 
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single lenders at a time, these following figures show distribution of mean signals and 





Note that the peaks and means of both lenders' private signal distributions occur at . 
Remembering from Proposition 1 that lender 's beliefs reflect the weighted average 
of its private signal and the mean individual type (i.e. ( ) = (1 − ) ∙ + ∙ ), 
we can graph the distribution of  and  type lenders’ beliefs for a borrower of type  as 
follows: 
As the diagram shows, since < , the peak and mean of ℎ( ) are closer to μ = 0 
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than the peak and mean of ℎ( ), respectively. Since these belief distributions are more 
squished than the signal ( ) distributions, note that the magnitude of their peaks are 
higher, to ensure that they each integrate to unity. Note also that for illustrative purposes 
in the example above, we have let = 1/2 and = 1/3 so that the peak of lender 's 
distribution occurs at = /2 and the peak of lender 's belief distribution occurs at 
θc= /3. 
Figure 4 illustrates the aggregate effect of Proposition 1: On average, lenders of both 
types tend to undervalue borrowers with >  and overvalue borrowers with < . 
Because concentrated lenders know their signals are more reliable, they do not 
undervalue or overvalue these borrowers as much as diversified lenders do. 
For a borrower of fixed type > , concentrated lenders have higher average beliefs 
on  than diversified lenders do, as stated in Corollary 2 to Proposition 1 and illustrated 
in Figure 4. As stated in Proposition 5, concentrated lenders also shade their beliefs less, 
making more competitive offers. Thus a strict majority of these borrowers will prefer and 
choose the offers of -type lenders. 
We will now show that for a given level > = 0 , we get a > 1/2 majority of 
borrowers with type  choose lender 's offer: Since <	  by Proposition 1 and ( ) = 	 ( ) , we observe that = ( ) < 	 ( ) = , and thus 
 = 1 − ( ) > 1 − ( ) = 1/2 
 
We have shown that a fraction > 1/2  of borrowers with > = 0 accept loans 
from concentrated lenders. Furthermore, a fraction < 1 − = 1/2 receive no offer 
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<  and thus accept no offer. These borrowers do not undertake any project. The 
remaining fraction < 1 − = 1/2 receive offers such that >  and > 0, 
accepting the diversified lender's offer. 
On the other hand, for < , diversified lenders will overestimate borrower type 
more than concentrated lenders do (Figure 5). As stated in Proposition 1, this effect 
grows as  falls farther below . If there were no other distortions, then all of these 
borrowers would prefer offers from the diversified lender who thinks more highly of 
them. However, these higher beliefs from the diversified lender are partially counteracted 
by the greater shading of its beliefs that the diversified lender does. The amount of 
shading due to updated beliefs is constant across b -- it varies only with , , and  
whereas the overvaluation of borrowers with type  <  increases as  falls. Therefore, 
we have Proposition 7. 
 
Proposition 7: Semi-Pooling/Semi-Separating Equilibrium 
There exists Θ <  such that 	∀		θ > : most borrowers of type θ who accept a loan 
do so from lender c and ∀		θ < 	 : most borrowers of type θ who accept a loan do so 





Note that for = 0, a strictly higher share of these borrowers face positive beliefs 
from lender  than  because ( ) d > ( ) d . Thus a higher share receive 
positive offers from lender  than . Since for a known/given , the distributions  and 
 are independent of each other, a strictly higher share of borrowers with < = 0 
accept lender 's offer than accept lender 's offer. To extend the result for other values 
of  and , when <  there will always exist some value of  above which ℎ( ) 
first order stochastically dominates ℎ( ) so that ℎ( ) d > ℎ( ) d .  
Finally, since all lenders are fully rational, they effectively process and are privy to all 
of the information we can analyze here. For any given , there also exists a Θ  and Θ  
below which most borrowers will not even receive an offer from the - and -type 
lenders respectively because a lender of type  will typically form beliefs about these 
borrowers that are below the borrowers’ minimum financing amounts (i.e. > ), as 
discussed above. (Note that as a consequence of Proposition 1, Θ > Θ  for >  and Θ < Θ  for < .) Consequently, although less informed, -type lenders expect to 
have a lower average borrower quality, their expectations are still in line with reality, and 
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both lenders’ profits are still ex post positive in expectation. As  increases, the value of Θ  may fall below Θ. Thus, for large loan amounts -- those which carry a greater risk and 
which lenders will therefore only make to higher quality borrowers -- the uninformed 
lender may get no business.  
 
4 Competition with Naive Lenders 
Next, we take into account naivete, in the form of lenders who do not take into the 
account the information from winning when placing a bid and furthermore does not 
expect its competitors to take information from winning into account when bidding 
either. As a result, naive lenders have a much simpler objective function than rational 
lenders discussed in the previous section. Each naive lender  chooses its optimal offer, ∗, in order to maximize its expected profits: [ | , ] = [ | , ] ∙ [ | , , ] = < ∙ ( − )= < ( ∗) ∙ ( − )	





Since the naive lenders face the same objective function and by Proposition 2 have 
the same beliefs about each other conditional on their own beliefs, their optimal offers as 
a function of their own beliefs are the same. This result is stated in Proposition 8: 
Proposition 8: For the same expected beliefs ( 	= 	 	≡ 	 ), naive lender n’s and 
m’s optimal loan offers ∗ and ∗ will be the same regardless of their types: ∗( ) 	= ∗( ) 	≡ 	 ∗( ) 
Furthermore, extending what we have already observed about ∗ to ∗, we note that: ∗( ) is an increasing function of b such that ∗( ) < . 
This optimal offer by a naive lender reflects shading of the first type but not of the 
second type. Accordingly, by Proposition 5, for the same signal, , a naive lender will 
always shade its offer less than a rational lender of the same type. Therefore, borrowers 
of all types will prefer the offer they receive from a naive lender to a rational lender of 
the same type receiving the same signal. 
When two naive lenders of opposite types compete against each other, winning 
contains adverse information for the -type lender and mixed (i.e. possibly adverse or 
favorable) information for the -type lender. Since -type lenders underestimate above-
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average borrowers and overestimate below-average borrowers more than -type lenders, 
a win by a -type lender contains not only information that its opponent had lower 
beliefs, and that it could have won with a lower offer, but also some tertiary information 
increasing the likelihood that the borrower was of below average type. This results in a 
third driver of winner’s curse that applies to -type lenders. 
Meanwhile, for a -type naive lender competing against a naive -type lender, 
winning indicates that its opponent had lower beliefs about the borrower’s type; 
surprisingly, this may not lower ’s beliefs ex post because a -type lender expects to 
form higher beliefs than -type lenders for above-average borrowers and lower beliefs 
for below-average borrowers. So finding out that it had the winning offer could actually 
increase ’s estimation of the borrower’s type for certain signals, in essence serving as 
the opposite of a winner’s curse.  
Detangling the net information effect of winning against a naive lender for  depends 
on the exact values of , ,  and of the signal . Nonetheless, for a rational observer, 
winning contains more adverse information for the -type lender. 
For a rational lender competing against a naive lender, there are some interesting 
effects to consider as well. A -type lender competing against a naive -type lender will 
shade for both types of winner’s curse but will temper that shading by placing a higher 
probability of being in an above-average borrower regime. A -type lender competing 
against a naive -type lender will shade for both types of winner’s curse and then some 
more by placing a higher probability of having selected a below-average borrower in the 
case of a win. Any rational lender competing against a naive lender of the same type will 
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simply shade for both types of winners curse and no more or less, because there is no 
tertiary information contained in a win against a naive lender of the same type. 
The chart below summarizes these findings: 
 
Table 1. Competition with Naive Lenders 
Lenders Competing Outcome 




• Rational lender shades for Type I & II 
Winner’s Curse but unshade for Winner’s 
Blessing 
• £ is higher than in fully rational case. c-
type makes more offers to the highest 
quality borrowers while d-type makes 
more offers to lowest quality borrowers 
(if it competes), perhaps even some that 
result in negative expected profits. 
•  
Rational d-type 
facing naïve c-type 
 
 
• Rational lender faces type I, II, & III 
Winner’s Curse, shading more than in 
fully rational case. 
• £ is lower than in fully rational case. 
Poorest-type borrowers still prefer d-type 
lender if it competes. Highest-type 
borrowers still prefer c-type lender. 
 
 
Rational lender facing 




• Rational lender shades for Type I & II 
Winner’s Curse 
• No tertiary information available through 
borrower selection. 
 




When lenders compete with asymmetric information, we find a semi-pooling/semi-
separating equilibrium with a separation threshold Θ above which most borrowers select 
the more informed lender and below which most borrowers select the less informed 
lender’s offer, if it is available. The more informed lender attracts better borrowers, 
offering them greater credit at more favorable rates, which we can interpret as also doing 
better in jumbo markets. Meanwhile, less informed lenders attract a lower-payoff mass of 
borrowers. Because their risk correspondence is higher, the more-informed lenders will 
make higher profits on retained mortgages. However, rational less-informed lenders will 
be expected to still make weakly positive profits in equilibria. 
In a competitive framework, bidding generates information and serves as a 
mechanism for spreading it across the market. Lenders behave differently when they 
know they face competition against other lenders with private signals. Rational lenders 
will shade their offers (i.e. underbid on their beliefs) under competition, choosing not to 
bid on borderline borrowers who ex ante seem profitable but who ex post, subject to 
information on a losing competitor’s signal, will seem unprofitable. The results from this 
model show that there exists information on the market via competition and that rational 
lenders of both types benefit from it, although lenders competing against a c-type lender 
benefit more, screening to a greater degree through the updated signal. 
Extending the results to competition amongst three or more lenders, the amount of 
information on the market increases with the number of competitors, screening on 
winning a borrower’s business increases by all rational players as well, and the weight on 
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the updated market signal will be a weighted average of the expected accuracies (i.e. σ ) 
of the lenders on the market. 
One puzzle that has been posed about mortgage markets is why poorer quality lenders 
are not crowded out of the market. If no resale market exists, market entry is restricted 
first and foremost by liquidity. Any lender with enough cash to lend will be able to enter 
until the point where there are so many lenders on the market where profits come down to 
zero. In practice, liquidity constraints on the mortgage market are quite significant -- see 
Wachter et al (2012) for a discussion on how the amount of money lent for mortgages on 
the market exceeds the amount of cash on the market by at least 100% as well as 
discussions of the separate liquidity constraints placed by federal regulations on different 
types of banks. As a result, we should not expect modern mortgage markets to exhibit 
perfect competition. Furthermore, there is evidence that borrowers approach a few 
lenders, not thousands, when they evaluate mortgage options. In such a market, both c-
type and d-type lenders can coexist without any crowding effects, with d-type lenders 
simply making less profit. 
If a resale market does exist, then it will provide some amount of liquidity, but in light 
of the model’s results it may actually benefit less-informed lenders over more-informed 
lenders, which have relatively positive soft information the resale market could be unable 
to process or value. In practice, resale markets generally will not have access to all of the 
information lenders have access to; soft information such as a lender’s type or the number 
of lenders it competed against for each loan may be difficult to verify in practice, 
particularly when loans are securitized. Assuming the resale market is not able to verify 
these factors, then all lenders competing in a rational framework have negative soft 
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information the moment they learn (or suspect) they have won. Less-informed lenders 
will have more negative information than informed lenders simply because they won 
against a more-informed competitor. Furthermore, an informed lender also has greater 
positive soft information knowing its own type and having greater confidence in its own 
signal. This makes loans originated by more-informed lenders less liquid in the resale 
market, because the market cannot properly value this difference in soft information. The 
resale process may price in a premium in anticipation of this negative soft information, 
but unless there is a timely reputation mechanism for separating loans by the originators’ 
type, this “lemons premium” will only further reduce liquidity of the more-informed 
lenders’ loans. Informed lenders will do much better to retain the loans they originate, 
perhaps selling some loans only if much more negative information becomes available on 
those borrowers down the line or if they run into cash constraints. 
A resale market that evaluates net present values of loans based on a subset of 
information available to lenders will also facilitate strong incentives for lenders to 
originate loans based on that subset of information alone. As we will see, if lenders can 
be held accountable for negative information they have on a borrower, information may 
then have negative value during resale. Access to information will not improve the 
quality of loans on the market as lenders with more information may even wish to pose as 
less-informed lenders, extending offers for loans they would never plan to retain. 
Naivete provides an additional explanation (beyond access to information) for why 
some lenders may originate poorer loan quality. Unlike less-informed rational lenders 
which still make positive profits in expectation, naive lenders may actually make loans 
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that are negative in expected profits, which was the case, it turns out, for many of the 
loans leading up to the 2008 mortgage crisis (see for example, Associated Press, 2012).  
In this model, naivete comes from failing to fully process private ex-post information 
about the value of a loan that is available through the auction process. But the findings 
extend to most any situation in which a lender has incentives to value a loan based only 
on a subset of available information. Resale is a particularly relevant example of where 
selective naivete may actually be advantageous. A lender might not have to reveal how 
carefully a borrower’s income level was verified or the amount of seller subsidies during 
resale, for example. If lenders go into the origination market with intention of possible 
resale, then a loan’s value to the lender is actually max( , resale value) rather than simply 
. As discussed above, if a lender has positive private information about  that it is not 
required to or cannot expose during resale, it would be better off retaining the loan. On 
the other hand, if it has adverse information which it could withhold from the resale 
market, then it will be better off selling that loan. The resale process will take into 
account the market’s expectation that lenders are more likely to sell lemons than cherries, 
and price in premia for resale accordingly. Not only does this further reduce liquidity for 
informed lenders’ loans, if the terms of loans are quite long, it could also take quite a 
while for this information to accurately update to the market, keeping premia inefficiently 
low for a period of time before the market corrects. 
As long as the premium for resale is not too high compared to the positive profits that 
come from retaining their loans, rational, more-informed lenders may have some 
incentive to resell some loans to get access to cash for making more loans. However, it 
may make sense for them to enter new markets as naive or uninformed lenders in order to 
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increase their liquidity, particularly if they can be held liable for negative information. 
Such predictions would be in line with Loutskina and Strahan's findings that concentrated 
lenders behave like uinformed lenders when they enter new geographical markets, 
making 25% fewer jumbo loans among other factors. 
In practice, faked or deliberate naivete might in fact be limited to certain subsets of 
loans, for example those which are easily securitizable or for which government 
sponsored entities such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac provide guarantees. This would 
explain why lenders may behave naively with regard to certain classes of loans and not 
others and in particular why the borrowers with lower  who don’t fall into government-
backed categories may not receive as many offers from deliberately less-informed 
lenders. 
To the extent that naivete rather than poorer access to information is driving lending 
behavior in certain segments of the market, then we would expect profits will come from 
resale rather than interest payments. In such a case, we might expect the velocity of loan 
resale as a ratio of the number of loans to be higher as poorly-incentivized naivete 
increases. 
The findings here also suggests that the post-merger improvements due to better 
processing of loans identified by Panetta may actually be deliberate and signal a shift 
towards intentions of retaining larger numbers of self-originated loans post-merger. This 
is a prediction that would be valuable to check and would indicate that lenders choose to 
specialize in retaining or reselling loans, the latter potentially resulting in too many poor 
loans being made. 
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In fact number of legal standards facilitate and exacerbate incentives for selective 
naivete. As Engel and Fitzpatrick (2012) describe, in the United States, the owners of 
mortgages are considered “holders of due course.” They must extend “duty of care” to 
ensure that the mortgage is not misdocumented; however, if an originator of the loan or 
another lender who previously held the loan exhibited poor behavior in accounting of the 
mortgage, the holder of due course cannot be held legally liable. This creates incentives 
for overstatement of borrower collateral documented by Ben-David (2007) and Cho and 
Megbolugbe (1996) and for lower borrower screening by lenders characterized by Keys 
et al (2009 and 2010), for those loans where there is an expectation of resale, particularly 
if the holder of the mortgage can separate itself from the origination process, as lenders 
have increasingly done. A lender won’t want to know a local market is on the verge of 
collapse if it can still resell the loan to others who are unaware of such local 
circumstances.  
An important distinction between uninformed and naive lending is that improved 
access to information via competitive bidding will not benefit to naive lenders or improve 
the quality or informativeness of their loans. In fact, it could have the opposite effect: 
increased asymmetries in information at origination yield higher expectations of ex post 
“learning” for rational lenders. This increases expectations of negative soft information 
by less-informed lenders and thus increases their expectations of resale (assuming resale 
markets exist), which in turn increases incentives for selective naivete at origination. 
The key conclusion here is that asymmetric information can actually incentivize 
naivete and bad types of resale (i.e. those due to negative soft information rather than a 
lender’s need for liquidity). 
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In extensions of this work, it will be fruitful to detect short versus long term 
motivation of lenders by considering relative levels of informed versus less informed 
lenders in market, as well as the relative velocity of resale compared to the number of 
loans. If we define a bubble as a market in which values increase mostly because of short 
term expectations of others’ expectations of value rather than through long term 
appreciation, then we would expect that leading up to a bubble, resale rather than interest 
rate payments would stand to make higher margins on profit. It will be helpful to know, 
leading up to the market crash in 2008, were uninformed lenders selling between selves, 
or was there some grand, particularly misincentivized aggregator, such as the government 
sponsored entitites? 
 
5.1.1 Mortgage Resale 
There are clearly some important questions to consider when evaluating the effects of 
mortgage resale on lender behavior: What information or accounting is used to 
characterize loans during resale? Are lenders’ signals, beliefs, types, and/or additional 
information learned during the early stages following origination contractible? 
Bleck and Gao evaluate the role of mark-to-market pricing compared with historical 
pricing, characterizing major differences between each method and situations when each 
outperforms the other. Developing a clearer understanding of what kinds of information 
are available to different lenders during resale is a major part of addressing what market 
structures will yield more efficient outcomes, both at resale and during origination. The 
findings in this study support this by showing that lender behavior, including possibly 
deliberate naivete, can vary significantly depending on the information available. 
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We have concluded that rational lenders may shade their beliefs considerably in the 
presence of competition, knowing that additional information about the borrower’s type 
will be revealed through the win/lose process. However, this will not be the case if firms 
sell their mortgages (either directly or via securitization) through a mechanism where 
their lender type is hidden and the mortgage value (i.e. its future profitability) can only be 
ascertained based on the lender's signal  , which the lender may elect to share with 
potential buyers. 
In case firms face the option to sell their mortgages via such a method where only   
can be used to justify the sales price, it is easy to see that diversified lenders, taking this 
extra revealed information into account, will choose to sell all their mortgages. By doing 
so, they are able to obtain the full profits discussed in the model above rather than the 
lower profits they will know to expect if they realize that information revealed when a 
borrower accepts their offer indicates they are on average of lower type than previously 
expected and thus will bring lower expected profits.  
Concentrated lenders actually may receive a higher ex ante signal upon winning a 
borrower’s business, since especially low-type borrowers will prefer naive uninformed 
lenders who overvalue them more on average. So, when faced with a similar option, 
concentrated lenders will choose to retain all of their mortgages rather than selling, since 
doing so allows them to obtain additional profits from this revealed information beyond 
what was discussed in the model above. These are additional expected profits they are 
unable to prove in a sale based on their signals alone. Furthermore, concentrated lenders 
may even increase their offers slightly for those mortgages they anticipate retaining, 
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knowing that borrowers who choose them over a diversified lender are of higher type on 
average. 
In a market focused on resale based on ex ante beliefs  rather than signals, naivete 
can actually generate more profits. If lender type is not revealed in the market, the signal 
can’t be weighed properly to come up with the lender’s own private belief, , so it will 
be weighed based on some average lender type and distortions will occur. In such a 
framework, we could easily end up with incentives for diversified lenders who extract 
better signals from poor borrowers because that increases the number of possible loans 
available for resale; the fact that this borrower population is of poorer quality than the 
signals reveal does not matter if it is possible to resell the loans while their market value 
has not depreciated. This could even result in incentives for informed lenders to pose as 
uninformed lenders, in order to generate higher signals on lower-type lenders. 
The conclusion here is that resale mechanisms that reveal information selective to 
different lender types can be distortionary and that a better understanding of this 
information is necessary to evaluate optimal resale accounting methods. 
It is also important to develop a better understanding of lenders themselves, what are 
the different types they cluster into, what is the share of lenders of different types in the 
market (concentrated versus diversified, naive versus rational), and their relative 
correlations and signal-to-noise levels? If competitors receive a highly correlated signals 
then they may expect very little or no additional learning to occur through the win/lose 
revelation mechanism. In such a setting, even rational lenders will bid according to their 
ex ante beliefs and make higher offers as a result. 
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Of course in reality, lenders are likely to have stronger signals about some borrowers 
than others, so even a diversified lender may show concentrated behavior regarding a few 
of their loans and vice versa. In addition, concentrated lenders may be able to reveal their 
type to some degree, perhaps to other lenders familiar with their market, to get a higher 
price than just their private signal  would yield from a potential buyer. Thus, we might 
expect concentrated lenders to sell some of their loans and diversified lenders to retain 
some in reality. 
5.2 Further Study & Applications 
There are a number of areas that can be highlighted for further study based on the 
discussion above. 
First, it is important to develop a better understanding of the level and nature of 
competition in existing mortgage markets. Little data seems to exist on the number of 
lenders and mortgage brokers that borrowers typically approach when applying for a 
mortgage. Barr et al (2012) summarize research on low-income communities in Detroit in 
which 67% of borrowers were offered loan options from only one lender by their 
mortgage brokers. The HMDA data discussed earlier could probably yield estimates of 
the number of mortgage applications borrowers submit at a time; however, if borrowers 
are advised, as lenders typically do, to reduce negative impacts on their credit reports by 
shopping for offers but finalizing only one application upon selecting a lender, then these 
figures could be different from the number of originators approached by a borrower.  
In order to accurately model the effect of information in lending markets, it is 
important to understand not only how many lenders typically compete for a mortgage, but 
also how this number varies across geography, credit worthiness and other borrower 
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characteristics, since these are often tied to mortgage risk and the availability of 
securitization and anticipated government guarantees. Furthermore, it is important to 
develop a better understanding of the role mortgage brokers play in the lending process. 
While on one hand, mortgage brokers may improve lending competition by reducing 
search costs and improving access to multiple lenders, they may also have incentives to 
absorb any surpluses, originating loans that have higher probability of resale, leaving 
little incentives for lenders to continue monitoring, and facilitating naivete on the part of 
lenders at the time when they define “to be arranged” loan programs. 
Secondly, as discussed in the previous section, it is critical to have a better 
understanding of resale processes and the information available to different parties when 
trading or guaranteeing mortgages. Incorporating not only the types of information but 
also the heterogeneity of mortgage buyers’ ability to process this information is 
absolutely key to developing realistic models of mortgage resale and origination markets 
and to understanding when, if ever, resale markets ultimately improve information 
available about loans as they were originally intended to do. 
Third, the insights from the model discussed in this paper suggest that leading up to a 
bubble caused by naive or uninformed lending practices, the rate of resale of mortgages 
should increase relative to the number of loans being originated. Further empirical 
validation of these results could yield metrics for anticipating and preventing future 
bubbles and could also shed light on the role of holders of large numbers of mortgages 
(such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) in slowing or hastening the size and speed of 
mortgage bubbles. Despite criticism of poor accounting of detailed loan information in 
the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS) used by government sponsored, 
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MERS contains a wealth of accurate information on the holders, buyers and sellers of 
mortgages since 1997. This information could be used to detangle mortgage resale 
networks leading up to 2008, to characterize different incentives for buying and selling as 
well as the role of misinformation versus poor incentives that pervaded the market for 
different players. 
Finally, the results suggest that improving availability of information on borrowers 
and their financing projects acts as a sort of public good. The better the accuracy and 
amount of information available to the whole market ex ante, the more accurately that 
lenders of all types will price mortgage offers and the lower the incentives for naivete. 
Policy makers may want to consider policies that would invest in public information or 
create incentives for lenders to share private knowledge about local employers via a 
common pool of information, in addition to directly increasing costs for naivete. 
 
6 Conclusion 
The theoretical framework developed in this paper provides a basis for understanding 
lender incentives and for evaluating policy changes regarding resale and origination. The 
findings suggest that less-informed lenders overvalue below-average borrowers and 
undervalue above-average borrowers more than informed lenders do. If they are rational, 
less-informed lenders also take on fewer loans; these loans will be of poorer quality, and 
thus yield lower but still positive profits. Less-informed lenders will also go on to sell 
more loans due to more negative soft information while informed lenders do the opposite. 
These findings are consistent with empirical literature on this topic treating diversified 
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lenders as less-informed lenders and concentrated lenders as more-informed lenders. The 
model also characterizes how the presence of informed competitor lenders on the market 
improves the amount of information available to rational lenders, as Loutskina and 
Strahan speculate in their concluding remarks. 
Besides providing a theoretical framework for evaluating these effects, this work 
shows how naivete provides an additional explanation for particularly poor lending 
behavior, including origination of loans with negative expected long term values to the 
lender. Because information asymmetry increases expectations of ex post negative soft 
information available for uninformed lenders in particular, it also makes resale a much 
more attractive option for them. Higher expectations of resale further amplify incentives 
for naivete on a broader range of factors beyond ex post learning, facilitating origination 
of low and negative expected value loans. This dynamic explains why we might expect to 
see increasingly poor quality loans leading up to the mortgage crisis in 2008, such as 
recent characterizations of blatant mortgage fraud, overstatement of assets and collateral 
by as much as 600% by Countrywide and other lenders by the Department of Justice. 
Although the presence of informed lenders can improve the loan quality and behavior 
of rational uninformed lenders, it has no such effect on naive lenders. In fact, due to the 
winner’s blessing for informed lenders and winner’s curse for uninformed lenders, it can 
actually exacerbate the problem for uninformed, naive lenders. Accordingly, it is 
important not to rely on the presence or market share of informed lenders to avoid a 
future mortgage crisis. To the extent that naive lending is a danger, only decreases in 
information asymmetry -- either by removing less informed lenders from the market or 
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by making previously private information ex ante public to lenders -- can address poor 
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C. Breakdown of Submissions by Number of Completed First Round Referee Evaluations and by Journal 
Number of Evaluations 
Received 
 Journal 1 Journal 2 Journal 3 Journal 4 Journal 5  
1           137            86            82           349            20 
2           567           484           385           670            91 
3           287           230           155           376            34 
4            30            38            17            56              2 
5              1              5              4              1   
            
Total Papers Receiving 





D. Final Editorial Decisions by First Round Referee Score at Journal 4 
For all papers receiving exactly two referee evaluations in the first round, the top panel shows how many received exactly 
zero, one and two positive referee recommendations (where positive is definied as revise/resubmit or acceptance) and how 
many of each of these were eventually accepted by editors (red) or rejected (blue). The lower two panels show the same 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































G. Cross-Validation Results 




H. Coefficient Path for LASSO Estimation 
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I. Referee Language as Predictors of Score and Impact at one Journal 
Plots of coefficients come from estimation of the following (n=5,724):    	 																	for	each	term	
	 	 						for	each	term	


































































































J. Histogram of p-values of referee terms in estimations of citations and referee scores 
P-Values of coefficients of referee terms come from estimation of:    	 																	for	each	term	
	 	 						for	each	term	
	      for 5,724 values of .  
The dotted line shows the uniform distribution of 
	
	
143.1 which would be expected if the referee term occurrence was random and contained no information.  
The lower panel shows the implied cumulative frequency distribution. Both panels demonstrate that low p-values (particularly those below 2.5%) occur much more frequently than would be 




























































































































































































































































































































































































K. Sample of Significant Referee Phrases  
For each of 5,724 phrases used by referees to describe at least fifteen papers, two unique regressions were carried out to determine 
significance and informativeness in predicting citations and in predicting referee score. Results are shown below for a sample of 111 
terms that are significant at the 10% level or better in at least one of the two regressions: 
	 						for	each	term	  
	 	 						for	each	term	  
Each term’s normalized coefficient for predicting citations ( / ) and for predicting referee score ( / ) are given together with 
their normalized standard errors. These can be compared to the mean values in the full sample of 5,724 observations: 	 / 0.84 
and / 0.048. Terms are shown ranked by decreasing / . As usual, (***), (**), and (*) indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level or better, respectively. 
 
Phrase  /   /  
the most important  2.236 (0.35)***  ‐0.067 (0.149)
government  2.019 (0.365)***  ‐0.039 (0.165)
literature has  1.668 (0.385)***  ‐0.348 (0.17)**
debate  1.554 (0.305)***  0.26 (0.135)*
extends  1.479 (0.39)***  0.156 (0.173)
[editor‐in‐chief] and  1.344 (0.402)***  ‐0.153 (0.171)
think the authors  1.325 (0.365)***  0.019 (0.16)
line with  1.205 (0.403)***  0.068 (0.18)
i wonder if  1.11 (0.378)***  0.07 (0.173)
doubt  1.095 (0.294)***  0.021 (0.132)
reaction  1.071 (0.396)***  ‐0.095 (0.179)
the current version  1.042 (0.365)***  ‐0.076 (0.166)
nice paper  1.028 (0.37)***  0.206 (0.166)
the authors need  1.02 (0.274)***  ‐0.056 (0.118)
the previous literature  0.991 (0.387)**  ‐0.178 (0.171)
interesting to see  0.953 (0.341)***  0.026 (0.155)
sensible  0.945 (0.26)***  0.048 (0.115)
my knowledge  0.93 (0.381)**  ‐0.204 (0.171)
would be interesting  0.926 (0.257)***  ‐0.001 (0.115)
can easily  0.921 (0.341)***  ‐0.206 (0.155)
the authors propose  0.92 (0.401)**  0.187 (0.18)
public  0.911 (0.338)***  ‐0.178 (0.148)
highlight  0.891 (0.359)**  ‐0.075 (0.159)
versions of  0.874 (0.395)**  ‐0.07 (0.181)
too much  0.868 (0.295)***  0.08 (0.129)
contrast to  0.861 (0.323)***  0.003 (0.141)
the existing literature  0.85 (0.308)***  ‐0.01 (0.138)
stronger  0.845 (0.259)***  ‐0.156 (0.114)
argue that the  0.829 (0.372)**  ‐0.129 (0.165)
the major  0.828 (0.387)**  ‐0.137 (0.171)
this literature  0.828 (0.264)***  ‐0.103 (0.119)
the contribution  0.82 (0.258)***  ‐0.093 (0.117)
the paper for  0.82 (0.4)**  ‐0.024 (0.179)
from [year] to [year]  0.82 (0.386)**  0.296 (0.173)*
not allow  0.815 (0.41)**  ‐0.496 (0.174)***
in favor of  0.801 (0.342)**  ‐0.093 (0.149)
i agree  0.8 (0.355)**  0.289 (0.16)*
into account the  0.799 (0.36)**  0.224 (0.161)
be nice to  0.794 (0.383)**  ‐0.214 (0.171)
the value of  0.741 (0.294)**  ‐0.068 (0.128)
be interesting to  0.726 (0.238)***  ‐0.09 (0.104)
why the authors  0.722 (0.355)**  0.049 (0.16)
heteroskedasticity  0.689 (0.386)*  0.448 (0.173)***
this finding  0.676 (0.391)*  ‐0.022 (0.172)
a serious  0.673 (0.308)**  ‐0.172 (0.133)
in my opinion  0.639 (0.256)**  ‐0.169 (0.112)
not understand the  0.616 (0.343)*  ‐0.163 (0.148)
value of the  0.608 (0.294)**  ‐0.128 (0.127)
nicely  0.583 (0.356)  0.281 (0.16)*
unclear  0.556 (0.192)***  ‐0.194 (0.084)**
but then  0.542 (0.273)**  ‐0.218 (0.119)*
my opinion  0.461 (0.225)**  ‐0.207 (0.098)**
finding  0.399 (0.188)**  ‐0.021 (0.081)
they do not  0.393 (0.296)  ‐0.462 (0.126)***
the identification  0.363 (0.299)  0.248 (0.135)*
 
Phrase  /   /  
important  0.298 (0.136)**  ‐0.122 (0.052)**
issues  0.268 (0.145)*  ‐0.128 (0.061)**
minor  0.249 (0.163)  0.134 (0.072)*
question  0.246 (0.151)  ‐0.119 (0.064)*
be shortened  0.241 (0.294)  ‐0.274 (0.129)**
addressed  0.217 (0.204)  0.187 (0.092)**
not seem to  0.175 (0.274)  ‐0.232 (0.122)*
interesting  0.17 (0.13)  ‐0.102 (0.052)*
journal  0.146 (0.141)  ‐0.134 (0.06)**
conditions  0.145 (0.177)  ‐0.13 (0.078)*
measure  0.129 (0.168)  ‐0.134 (0.074)*
authors should  0.117 (0.171)  ‐0.203 (0.074)***
the use of  0.104 (0.155)  ‐0.119 (0.067)*
exogenous  0.104 (0.24)  ‐0.227 (0.105)**
appropriately  0.102 (0.322)  0.26 (0.146)*
problems  0.081 (0.146)  ‐0.117 (0.064)*
problems with the  0.07 (0.381)  ‐0.407 (0.171)**
the assumption that  0.07 (0.259)  ‐0.223 (0.114)*
assumptions  0.066 (0.154)  ‐0.155 (0.067)**
related  0.04 (0.144)  ‐0.125 (0.063)**
i do not  0.032 (0.152)  ‐0.224 (0.064)***
not clear  0.027 (0.164)  ‐0.119 (0.072)*
sophisticated  ‐0.004 (0.38)  0.293 (0.172)*
similar  ‐0.006 (0.14)  ‐0.118 (0.062)*
misleading  ‐0.033 (0.222)  ‐0.252 (0.098)**
related to  ‐0.035 (0.169)  ‐0.147 (0.076)*
structural  ‐0.035 (0.152)  ‐0.125 (0.068)*
unless  ‐0.039 (0.238)  ‐0.251 (0.106)**
wellknown  ‐0.047 (0.365)  ‐0.388 (0.162)**
correlated with  ‐0.049 (0.277)  ‐0.248 (0.124)**
one cannot  ‐0.051 (0.352)  ‐0.297 (0.157)*
the specification  ‐0.057 (0.277)  ‐0.228 (0.124)*
motivation for  ‐0.061 (0.244)  ‐0.253 (0.108)**
errors  ‐0.075 (0.151)  ‐0.122 (0.067)*
be helpful to  ‐0.082 (0.271)  0.212 (0.124)*
this paper uses  ‐0.095 (0.32)  ‐0.239 (0.143)*
do not see  ‐0.096 (0.296)  ‐0.324 (0.133)**
motivation for the  ‐0.101 (0.329)  ‐0.347 (0.147)**
as it stands  ‐0.117 (0.321)  ‐0.27 (0.144)*
did not  ‐0.13 (0.213)  ‐0.211 (0.096)**
like to see  ‐0.148 (0.236)  0.198 (0.109)*
fine  ‐0.149 (0.232)  0.254 (0.108)**
error  ‐0.15 (0.128)  ‐0.125 (0.058)**
not do  ‐0.166 (0.365)  ‐0.415 (0.163)**
problematic  ‐0.175 (0.256)  ‐0.207 (0.115)*
competing  ‐0.186 (0.295)  ‐0.29 (0.132)**
motivate the  ‐0.208 (0.317)  ‐0.279 (0.143)*
i am not  ‐0.209 (0.153)  ‐0.174 (0.069)**
specifications  ‐0.237 (0.207)  ‐0.157 (0.094)*
limitation  ‐0.29 (0.351)  ‐0.268 (0.159)*
assumes that  ‐0.3 (0.288)  ‐0.303 (0.13)**
have done  ‐0.329 (0.347)  0.296 (0.161)*
the author  ‐0.329 (0.134)**  ‐0.108 (0.065)*
rejection  ‐0.35 (0.28)  ‐0.255 (0.127)**
problems of  ‐0.366 (0.349)  ‐0.268 (0.158)*
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L. OLS of Citation Impact on Submission Characteristics 
variable coefficient se 
intercept 21.870 (32.179)  
Earliest MS˙Available -7.471 (9.1119)  
Earliest Version Length 0.0030 (0.0015) * 
Latest MS Available -3.406 (3.9429)  
Latest Version Length 0.0005 (0.0001) *** 
Number Revisions -0.463 (0.4910)  
fit 37.826 (26.930)  






M. OLS of Citation Impact on Editor Fixed Effects and Mentions 
 
variable coefficient se 
Intercept 335.32 (66.455) *** 
Received date -0.008 (0.0016) *** 
coeditor_chief -6.451 (3.3847) * 
coeditor_1 5.5417 (3.0754) * 
coeditor_2 -6.463 (2.9651) ** 
coeditor_3 -9.480 (4.2655) ** 
coeditor_4 -3.920 (4.3875)  
coeditor_5 -3.742 (6.6674)  
coeditor_6 -5.861 (6.7446)  
coeditor_7 -5.104 (5.2049)  
coeditor_8 -4.197 (2.9883)  
coeditor_9 -10.16 (3.6600) *** 
ml_coeditor_chief 1.1712 (0.2246) *** 
ml_coeditor_1 -1.960 (0.7610) ** 
ml_coeditor_2 -0.289 (1.1866)  
ml_coeditor_3 0.1787 (0.1579)  
ml_coeditor_4 -0.552 (1.0865)  
ml_coeditor_5 0.0517 (1.5048)  
ml_coeditor_6 -0.213 (0.2646)  
ml_coeditor_7 -1.317 (3.7155)  
ml_coeditor_8 -0.961 (0.6537)  
ml_coeditor_9 -1.322 (1.3423)  
ml_coeditor_10 0.1168 (0.3492)  
ml_coeditor_11 0.1117 (0.8174)  
coeditor_chief*ml_coeditor_chief -0.912 (0.3038) *** 
coeditor_1*ml_coeditor_1 1.2794 (0.8056)  
coeditor_2*ml_coeditor_2 0.6622 (1.4263)  
coeditor_3*ml_coeditor_3 -0.122 (0.3250)  
coeditor_4*ml_coeditor_4 1.0491 (1.6801)  
coeditor_7*ml_coeditor_7 -0.253 (11.580)  
coeditor_8*ml_coeditor_8 1.0491 (0.9077)  
coeditor_9*ml_coeditor_9 1.0846 (1.7010)  
 
 
In this table, the notation coeditor_k is used to denote a dummy variable indicating that coeditor k was 
assigned to the manuscript and ml_coeditor_k is used to denote the number of mentions of coeditor k’s last 




N. Referee Decisions Across Journals 
1. BINOMIAL LOGIT ON DECISION TO REFER             
variable 1 2 3 4 5 
intercept   -27.6229 *** -27.091 *** -15.9013 *** 15.2929 *** 6.7588   
date   0.0007 *** 0.0007 *** 0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0002   
past reviews_i -0.0262 *** -0.0201 *** -0.0628 *** 0.0379 ** 0.0595   
past reviewsˆ2_i 0.0001 *** 0 *** 0.0002 *** -0.0003   0.0016   
revision_p   1.1012 *** 0.2765   0.7114 *** 0.3351 *** 0.1263   
 
2. ORDERED LOGIT ON REFEREE SCORE CONDITIONAL ON ACCEPTANCE TO REFER 
variable 1 2 3 4 5
cutoff1   -11.8306 -6.6577 -23.286 -11.2867 *** -2.8984
cutoff2   -11.2069 -6.0427 -22.6814 -7.3868 *** -2.2737
cutoff3   12.1214 *** 16.0313 *** 1.0083 -5.0019 ** 21.9296 *
cutoff4   13.1441 *** 17.0683 *** 2.1442 -4.3668 ** 22.9138 *
cutoff5   14.2023 *** 18.186 *** 3.1603 -3.464 * 23.816 *
cutoff6   14.2399 *** 18.2387 *** 3.234 -2.7651 23.8677 *
cutoff7   16.8408 *** 21.108 *** 5.8947 -1.7225 26.1454 **
date (years) -0.1326 *** -0.1682 *** -0.0278 0.0491 *** -0.2203 *
past reviews_i 0.0032 0.0053 ** 0.0151 *** 0.0298 *** 0.0008
revision_p   0.3002 * 0.3467 * 0.5927 ** -2.479 *** 0.1208
total reviews_i -0.0012 -0.0026 -0.0114 ** -0.0074 0.0173
fit_p 1.1182 -5.0369 ** 9.0305 *** -8.983 *** -4.6319
fit_avail_p -0.5104 3.0866 ** -1.1685 *** 0.1421 0.8396
length_p (1000s) -0.1458 *** -0.1534 *** -0.2013 *** -0.1367 *** -0.1135 **
length_avail_p 1.4889 -1.9831 1.5117 *** 0.7482 ** 0.2905
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O. Ordered Logit of Referee Evaluation at Journal 4 
variable Coefficient se 
(threshold1) -6.681 (0.4834) *** 
(threshold2) -2.6894 (0.2672) *** 
(threshold3) -0.3162 (0.2619)
(threshold4) 0.3259 (0.262)
(threshold5) 1.2673 (0.2632) *** 
(threshold6) 2.0918 (0.2668) *** 
(threshold7) 3.0553 (0.2785) *** 
E(citations) (n) 0.0128 (0.0024) *** 
Received Date (n) -0.1457 (0.0258) *** 
fit_flag 0.0171 (0.1592)
fit -3.3669 (3.5135)
coeditor_chief 0.8986 (0.1972) *** 
coeditor_1 0.8223 (0.212) *** 
coeditor_2 0.9684 (0.2129) *** 
coeditor_3 1.6918 (0.2079) *** 
coeditor_4 1.5697 (0.2178) *** 
coeditor_6 0.9857 (0.3628) *** 
coeditor_7 1.3458 (0.2762) *** 
coeditor_8 0.5125 (0.2116) ** 
coeditor_9 0.7543 (0.2819) *** 
ml_coeditor_5 1.292 (0.2092) *** 
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P. (1) Logit of Editorial Decisions on Fit, Scores and Expected Citation Impact at Journal 4 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
  coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.  var( ) 
Intercept -2.435 -0.389*** -2.06 0.5775*** -2.11 0.543*** -2.062 0.6042* -2.177 0.7006***     
E[citations] 0.0021 0.0069 -0.015 0.057         0.0202 0.0624 6.6977 112.36 
Date 0.2443 0.0511*** 0.3128 0.0754*** 0.3199 0.0703*** 0.3575 0.0764* 0.3614 0.0774* 4.4652 2.8169 
fit_flag -0.287 0.3556 -0.814 0.4432*** -0.818 0.4428* -0.843 0.5089* -0.852 0.5096*** 0.9411 0.0555 
fit 16.889 6.1533*** 17.854 7.4571** 17.971 7.4399** 17.747 8.0041** 17.945 8.0313** 0.0061 0.0001 
#pos             0.8386 0.1644*** 0.8784 0.206*** 0.8549 0.8478 
#neg             -1.672 0.2565*** -1.631 0.2853*** 1.2639 0.8088 
#pos*E[cit]     0.1692 0.0262*** 0.1638 0.0159*** 0.0303 0.0164* 0.0224 0.0295 5.7195 223.74 
#neg*E[cit]     -0.364 0.0356*** -0.366 0.0342*** -0.087 0.0374** -0.095 0.0434** 8.093 191.73 
(***) indicates significance at the 1% level or better, (**) at the 5% level or better, and (*) at the 10% level or better.     
 
See Appendix P.2 for point estimate analysis of significance, sign, an effect size of each estimator. 
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P. (2) Odds Ratios and First Difference Analysis of Logit of Editorial Decisions on Fit, Scores 
and Expected Citation Impact at Journal 4 
 coeff ( ) s.e. ( ) odds ratio range 
 ∆ accept  
(1) 
Intercept -2.435 -0.389 (0.129,0.059)*  
E[citations] 0.0021 0.0069 (0.968,1.062)  (-0.003,0.003) 
Date 0.2443 0.0511 (2.369,3.74)*  (-0.054,0.069) 
fit˙flag -0.287 0.3556 (0.546,1.067)  (0.01,-0.01) 
fit 16.889 6.1533 (1.068,1.151)*  (-0.024,0.027) 
#pos      
#neg      
#pos*E[cit]      
#neg*E[cit]      
(2) 
Intercept -2.06 0.5775 (0.072,0.227)*  
E[citations] -0.015 0.057 (0.617,1.325)  (0.005,-0.005) 
Date 0.3128 0.0754 (2.886,5.66)*  (-0.013,0.021) 
fit˙flag -0.814 0.4432 (0.306,0.705)*  (0.007,-0.005) 
fit 17.854 7.4571 (1.065,1.167)*  (-0.005,0.006) 
#pos      
#neg      
#pos*E[cit] 0.1692 0.0262 (2.266,3.057)*  (-0.03,0.263) 
#neg*E[cit] -0.364 0.0356 (0.039,0.07)*  (0.805,-0.032) 
(3) 
Intercept -2.11 0.543 (0.07,0.209)*  
E[citations]      
Date 0.3199 0.0703 (3.048,5.711)*  (-0.014,0.022) 
fit˙flag -0.818 0.4428 (0.305,0.703)*  (0.007,-0.006) 
fit 17.971 7.4399 (1.066,1.168)*  (-0.005,0.006) 
#pos      
#neg      
#pos*E[cit] 0.1638 0.0159 (2.33,2.795)*  (-0.03,0.252) 
#neg*E[cit] -0.366 0.0342 (0.039,0.068)*  (0.812,-0.033) 
(4) 
Intercept -2.062 0.6042 (0.07,0.233)*  
E[citations]      
Date 0.3575 0.0764 (3.508,6.941)*  (-0.019,0.033) 
fit˙flag -0.843 0.5089 (0.28,0.73)*  (0.009,-0.008) 
fit 17.747 8.0041 (1.061,1.17)*  (-0.007,0.008) 
#pos 0.8386 0.1644 (1.78,2.357)*  (-0.023,0.047) 
#neg -1.672 0.2565 (0.087,0.167)*  (0.128,-0.034) 
#pos*E[cit] 0.0303 0.0164 (1.083,1.306)*  (-0.016,0.024) 
#neg*E[cit] -0.087 0.0374 (0.365,0.669)*  (0.089,-0.03) 
(5) 
Intercept -2.177 0.7006 (0.056,0.228)*  
E[citations] 0.0202 0.0624 (0.754,1.739)  (-0.008,0.01) 
Date 0.3614 0.0774 (3.554,7.095)*  (-0.02,0.034) 
fit˙flag -0.852 0.5096 (0.278,0.725)*  (0.009,-0.008) 
fit 17.945 8.0313 (1.062,1.172)*  (-0.007,0.008) 
#pos 0.8784 0.206 (1.777,2.527)*  (-0.024,0.05) 
#neg -1.631 0.2853 (0.089,0.183)*  (0.123,-0.034) 
#pos*E[cit] 0.0224 0.0295 (0.96,1.346)  (-0.012,0.017) 
#neg*E[cit] -0.095 0.0434 (0.326,0.659)*  (0.103,-0.032) 
Odds	ratio	range	 ≡ , . For each  the odds ratio is the factor by which  improves (or reduces) the odds of 
getting accepted. The range reflects a confidence interval for the odds ratio corresponding to values of ∈  (i.e. the estimated 
coefficient  one std. error). Ratios greater than one reflect an improvement in the odds of getting accepted whereas ratios less than one 
reflect reduced odds of acceptance. Those  for which the range excludes zero can be considered significant (*). The ratio of the high to 
low values in each range remains constant for all values of . ∆ ≡ accept ̅ , accept ̅  reflects the size of ’s 
effect at the mean ̅, i.e. increase in probability of acceptance due to a one sample standard deviation (decrease, increase) in  at ̅. 
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variable coefficient se 
(threshold) -5.6599 0.9451 *** 
max_revision 2.7321 0.5289 *** 
Received Date (n) 0.4441 0.1245 *** 
pos_eval 0.9864 0.1917 *** 
neg_eval -1.9567 0.2646 *** 
coeditor_chief -3.8928 0.785 *** 
coeditor_1 -0.4415 0.6116  
coeditor_2 -0.157 0.6325  
    
coeditor_3 -2.1226 0.8073 *** 
coeditor_4 -3.7313 1.0386 *** 
coeditor_5 -2.9344 0.9031 *** 
coeditor_6 -1.7987 1.4302  
coeditor_7 -1.911 1.3671  
coeditor_8 -0.7989 0.7321  




























Variable coefficient se 
(threshold) -6.3558 1.0763 *** 
max˙revision 3.3071 0.4134 *** 
Received Date (n) 0.4811 0.1361 *** 
pos_latest_eval 1.1511 0.2651 *** 
neg_latest_eval -2.6995 0.378 *** 
coeditor˙chief -3.481 0.8146 *** 
coeditor_1 -0.6959 0.7064   
coeditor_2 -0.1908 0.7286   
coeditor_3 -2.42 0.9702 ** 
coeditor_4 -3.427 1.1074 *** 
coeditor_5 -3.5892 1.0426 *** 
coeditor_6 -1.4099 1.4023   
coeditor_7 -1.9232 1.6301   
coeditor_8 -1.1455 0.8122   
coeditor_9 0.5781 1.1103   
coeditor_chief*ml_coeditor_chief 0.0337 0.0723   
coeditor_1*ml_coeditor_1 0.2814 0.1343 ** 
coeditor_2*ml_coeditor_2 0.3699 0.434   
coeditor_3*ml_coeditor_3 0.0655 0.0817   
coeditor_4*ml_coeditor_4 -0.0256 0.5161   
coeditor_8*ml_coeditor_8 0.0719 0.1345   
coeditor_9*ml_coeditor_9 -0.1694 1.0901   
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BINOMIAL LOGIT OF EDITORIAL ACCEPT/REJECT CONDITIONAL ON AVAIL. TEXT DATA
intercept   237.3982 122.8479 372.5109  -347.054 *** -718.247
year_p   -0.1192   -0.0629   -0.187   0.1697 *** 0.3568   
fit_p 16.7509 ** 16.7791 *** -6.9359   16.2972 * -5.2142   
length_p (1000s words) 0.1952 *** 0.4601 *** 0.5919 *** 0.1541 *** 0.3023   
avg_reviewer_rating_p 0.0116 *** 0.013 *** 0.0163 *** 0.0244 *** 0.0182 ***
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T. Proof of Proposition 1 
We seek an expression for bi(ti)≡E(|ti), so we start with Lemma 1. 
Lemma 1 





As normal distributions, N(,), i~N(0,i), and ti~N(,+i) have the property 




  and  E() ≡ ̅ =   















U. Proof of Proposition 2: 
We wish to show that for the same expected beliefs (bi = bj ≡ b), lender i’s 
expectations about j’s beliefs are the same as j’s expectations about i’s beliefs: 
 
Ei (bj | bi=b)  =  Ei (bi | bj=b) 
 
We begin by finding an expression for  Ei (tj | ti) using the expressions we used for ti, 
tj and obtained for bi(ti)≡E(|ti) from the proof of Proposition 1. Thus: 
 
| | | | 	 |  
 
Note that | ≡ |  and remember from Proposition 1 that  
| 	 1  
 
Thus we have: 
| | 	 1  
 
Now, we can use this expression together with the known value for j's weighting 
factor ( ) to obtain i's expectation of j's beliefs: 
| | 	 1
	  
 
when 0, this expression becomes: 
  
| 	  
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